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ABSTRACT
Caught in an Undertow of Corruption:
Stalled Democratization in
Bosnia-Herzegovina
by
William Joseph Murray
Dr. Kenneth Fernandez, Examination Committee Chair
Assistant Professor o f Political Science
University o f Nevada, Las Vegas

Ethno-nationalism continues to be perceived by the international community as the
primary source o f Bosnia’s political instability, and is seen as the leading cause o f its
stalled democratic consolidation. This thesis explores this premise, and questions whether
international policy debates regarding Bosnia’s future should continue to be framed in
these terms.
In-depth exploratory interviews were employed to examine political attitudes within a
sample o f thirty-one middle class Bosnian citizens. Findings suggest that middle class
Bosnians are forming new political attitudes. Perceptions o f corruption among Bosnia’s
middle class may be emerging as a barrier to democratic consolidation. Since a politically
engaged middle class has been a vital underpinning o f previous democratic transitions,
this potential trend o f political alienation may be a warning sign for Bosnia's nascent
democracy.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION
Bosnia-Herzegovina's thirteen-year political morass is a widely recognized problem.
At a recent speaking engagement in May 2008, at the Johns Hopkins Paul H. Nitze
School o f Advanced International Studies, the current High Representative in BosniaHerzegovina, Miroslav Lajcak, described Bosnia's unchanging political situation as "near
paralysis" (OHR, 2008). The United States Institute o f Peace recently described Bosnia
as a "dysfunctional state" (USIP, 2008), and in a 2008 interview with the Observer,
Paddy Ashdown, Bosnia's fourth High Representative, stated that "after 10 years o f
progress which made Bosnia the world's most successful exercise in post-conflict
reconstruction, there is a real threat o f Bosnia breaking up again" (Observer, 2008).
Giuliano Amato, Chairman o f the International Commission on the Balkans, has
described the western Balkans as an “isolated ghetto” (International Commission on the
Balkans, 2005).
The policy discourse o f politicians like Lajcak and Ashdown, and a premise shared by
many academics that study Bosnia (for example see Tuathail (2006), Hayden (2005), and
Touquet and Vermeersch (2008)) holds that ethno-nationalism remains Bosnia's primary
(and perhaps only) source of political instability. The ethno-nationalism theme is also
commonly found in various European Union documents such as the amiual Bosnia and

Herzegovina Progress Reports’ prepared and published by the European Commission.
This thesis questions this fundamental proposition. It does not argue that nationalism has
become unimportant. Rather, it asks whether problems other than ethno-nationalism may
be emerging as additional sources o f political instability. Findings tentatively support this
hypothesis.
The empirical research for this thesis involves a qualitative assessment o f political
attitudes among a small sample o f Bosnia’s middle class. In February 2008, thirty-one
middle class Bosnian citizens participated in confidential, in-depth interviews.
Participants were provided an opportunity to anonymously express deeply held attitudes
toward their government. Participant responses reveal disillusiomnent with Bosnian and
EU governance, and democracy. Symptoms include political apathy, a declining
confidence in democracy, a desire to leave the country, and a viewpoint that some nondemocratic methods o f governance may be an acceptable solution to the country's severe
corruption problem. Importantly, many participants do not now view democracy as what
Schmitter and Guilhot (2000) term the “only game in town”. All participants vigorously
described endemic political corruption as the primary source o f this disaffection. The
qualitative conclusions drawn by this thesis are not statistically generalizable to a larger
population. However, the interview transcriptions are so striking that they raise legitimate
concerns that a larger percentage o f the country’s middle class, may be withdrawing from
civic society.

’ The Bosnia and Herzegovina Progress Reports are an annual report from the
European Commission to the European Council and Parliament addressing progress made
toward European Union membership.

The likelihood o f such a trend is worrisome. A democracy that does not vigorously
engage its middle class effectively amounts to a form o f despotism that Tocqueville
(1840, Volume 11, Section 4) concluded "conditions, softens, bends, and guides men's
wills". A democracy in this condition "compresses, enervates, extinguishes, and stupefies
its people" (ibid.), and poses one o f its greatest dangers (ibid.). If future academic
research satisfactorily links Bosnia's endemic corruption to widespread political
alienation, it would signify the emergence o f a new risk to Bosnia’s nascent democracy
and EU membership plans.
A country’s middle class includes business people, professionals, shopkeepers,
teachers, civil-servants, managers, technicians, clerical, and sales workers (Huntington,
1991, p. 66). This social group contributes to the democratic decision making process
tlirough the influence of its own distinct self-serving attitudes and agendas. An articulated
and coalesced middle class has both a witting and unwitting influence on a less
sophisticated, malleable, and manipulable general public. Through this influence, it
shapes social choice and public opinion formation. A non-partisan middle class provides
rhetorical ammunition for the less-infbrmed, and helps the public distinguish sound
policy from ideological obfuscation. This elite sector can play an especially important
role during political transition. In virtually every country the most active supporters of
democratization have come from the urban middle class (Huntington, 1991, p. 67).
During the “transition years” in Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic, for example,
middle class elites opposing earlier socialist regimes emerged to unify and make a
constructive contribution to democratization (Higley and Pakulski, 2000, p. 125). In
contrast, Slovakian, Bulgarian, and Russian, legacy “parties o f power” have remained

dominant and continue to “ride roughshod” over their opponents (ibid.). In BosniaHercegovina, where opposition elites still remain weak, nationalist elites that emerged
during the civil war have effectively done the same.
In a worst-case scenario, political alienation could drive Bosnia’s middle class to
endorse, and perhaps influence others to endorse, a political party that convincingly
promises more effective governance through non-democratic means. Its democratization
could thus come to a standstill or slide backwards. At best, there is a distinct possibility
that a decline in the public engagement o f Bosnia’s middle class, over the long-term, will
allow the continued stranglehold o f ethno-nationalism in the political arena, further
weakening the country's already lethargic democratic and economic reforni process.
Bosnia could continue to lose legitimacy in the eyes o f European Union member states
and ultimately may suffer economic and political sanctions due to its poor performance.
Recent examples o f this scenario are found in Bulgaria, which gained EU membership in
2007, but may already see billions in EU funding frozen amid fears o f fraud (Economist,
2008); and Turkey, where a prolonged EU membership process has caused a decline in
local public support for membership (Civilitas Research, 2005).
Today, the political trajectory for Bosnia is aimed at European Union
membership. Bosnia is currently categorized as a “potential candidate”, participating in
what is termed the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) to guide it down its long
road to accession. The overarching goal o f the SAP is to compel Bosnia to enact
institutional reform, on its own initiative, that will facilitate coordination with the heavily
institutionalized European Union. The prospect o f EU membership is anticipated to
serve as a stimulus for nationalist elites to redirect their attention to economic reform.

ethnie tolerance, and regional security. Compliance with the many prerequisites for
membership, commonly referred to as the “conditionality criteria”, also assures existing
EU member states o f the validity o f additional enlargement. Although the SAP process is
succeeding in building local democratic institutions, the “conditionality criteria” offer
few direct incentives for Bosnia to escalate its fight against corruption, which has seen
little success since the civil war ended in late 1995. If further research finds political
alienation widespread, this thesis recommends that the EU should consider "raising the
bar" for membership by including measurable reductions in corruption as part o f its
“conditionality criteria”.
Although this study is not historical in scope, it begins by providing an account o f
Bosnia’s recent political evolution in order to correctly frame what follows.
Consequently, Chapter 2 provides a description o f Bosnia’s current sociopolitical
problems and then defines Bosnia’s trajectory to European Union membership within the
context o f Dayton and the Security Pact for South-Eastern Europe. Chapter 3 and 4
provide a theoretical basis for this paper. Chapter 3 explains thé dependency of
democracy on legitimacy. Chapter 4 explores the nature o f public opinion and its parallel
relationship to legitimacy. Chapter 5 evaluates corruption’s corrosive effect on legitimacy
and democracy. Building on the work o f theorists such as Rose-Ackemian, Diamond, and
Morlino, Chapter 5 further explores corruption’s influence on civic attitudes, political
behavior and expressions at the political level. Chapter 5 also documents and analyzes the
endemic corruption that currently exists in Bosnia. Chapter 6 describes the field research,
interview process, and findings. It attempts to identify where political loyalties and
priorities truly lie and if the EU’s reform policies are aligned accordingly. Finally,

Chapter 7 provides a summary o f this thesis and makes recommendations for further
research.

CHAPTER 2

THE POLITICAL CONTEXT OF BOSNIA
The Paradox o f Dayton
Thirteen years have passed since the signing o f the General Framework Agreement
for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina^ marked an end to the Bosnian war o f secession. It
has also been nine years since the EU’s affirmation o f the Security Pact for South Eastern
Europe^ in the wake of the Kosovo conflict. Both o f these protocols led to billions of
dollars worth o f reconstruction funds, material, democratization efforts, humanitarian aid,
and commitment to a revitalization o f Bosnia and Herzegovina’s future. Since 1995,
almost every aspect o f Bosnia and Herzegovina’s economic and political development
has been designed, supervised and monitored by a vast array o f non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), and American and European experts. Tens o f thousands o f foreign
diplomats, consultants, specialists, and missionaries have at one time or another
descended on this small country o f 4.5 million (CIA World Factbook, 2008).
In 1998 a Wall Street Journal article estimated that there were more than 50,000
civilian workers in the country ( IFa// Street Journal, 1998). Hospitals, schools, electric
transmission networks, power plants, transportation infrastructure, and a major airport
have been reconstructed, not to mention the removal o f thousands of anti-personnel

^ Commonly referred to as the “Dayton Peace Accords”.
^ The Stability Pact o f 1999 promised eventual candidate status to the states o f the
western Balkans.

mines and unexploded ordinance left from the war. Today, Bosnia’s government
continues to be overseen by the highly structured process o f European Union assimilation
and democratization known as the Stabilization and Association Process. Yet, despite this
immense economic'^ and human achievement, widespread physical reconstruction, and
the creation of democratic institutions, Bosnia's moribund consociational political system
calls the country's viability into question. That such extensive investment in time and
money has resulted in such little substantive political progress is a widely acknowledged
paradox.
In a May 2008 speech to the Sarajevo based Circle 99 association,^ the US
Ambassador to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Charles English, characterized Bosnia as being
"trapped in stagnation" (Embassy o f the United States, 2008). On September 2008, the
current High Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Miroslav Lajcak, stated "I have seen
the same atmosphere that I see today in Sarajevo-Banja Luka relations twice in my life. I
saw it first in the Bratislava-Prague relations, and then in those between Podgorica and
Belgrade, and we all know how that turned out”^ (Bosnian Insight, 2008). In his 2008
report to the United Nations Security Council, Lajcak describes the domestic parties'
conceptions o f necessary refonu as "antithetical and non-negotiable" (UNSC, 2008).

Between 1995 and 2000, Europe had contributed over 2 billion euros toward
assistance (European Assistance, 2000).
^ The Circle 99 group was founded in 1992, during the siege o f Sarajevo, and
originally comprised a small group of Sarajevo intellectuals, whose intention it was to
elaborate on their intellectual resistance to aggression and nationalism. (Refer to
http://www.krug99.ba/eng/99/krug/Onama.htm)
^ In this statement, Lajcak is referring to the secession o f Montenegro from Serbia.

Widely reeognized indiees o f government performanee further reveal the extent o f the
paradox. Bosnia ranks 54 out o f 60 in the Foreign Poliey Failed State Index (2007). In the
Index o f Economie Freedom (2008), Bosnia is eategorized as ‘Mostly Unffee’ and ranked
38 o f 41 eountries in the European region, with an overall seore well below the regional
average. Freedom House rankings improved after the war, but have only improved from
5 to 4 sinee 1996. Bosnia as only ‘Partly Free’ in its Freedom in the World survey (2008).
Transpareney International ranks Bosnia 84* in its Corruption Pereeptions Index (2007),
with a rating o f 2.9, whieh plaees it generally above only undeveloped Afriean states.
Furthermore, the High Representative eontinues to need his extensive exeeutive and
legislative authority to leverage refonu. Aecording to the European Commission, Bosnia
and Herzegovina Progress Report (2007), between January 1, 2007 and September 30,
2007, the High Representative used his exeeutive powers on 31 oecasions, whieh
ineluded the foreed imposition o f legislation and the removal o f officials. Organized
erime and corruption are thriving (Anastasijevie, 2003). Citizens are dissatisfied with
elected officials (Survey by the Center for Democraey and Reconciliation in Southeast
Europe, 2004). Bosnia’s unemployment approaches 29 percent (Emerging Europe
Monitor, 2008). Its public sector accounts for nearly 50 percent o f GDP (International
Monetary Fund, 2008) and approximately 20 percent o f the population lives in poverty
(USAID, 2005). Analysts understand that, left to their own devices, many Bosnians
would still “work to make the current internal lines o f division permanent” (Soberg,
2006, p. 46). Moreover, Bosnia now finds itself last in line for European Union
membership: behind Croatia, Turkey, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Albania, that
is a failure made sharply ironic by the fact that, before the war, Yugoslavia was in many

ways “better poised than any other socialist country to make a successful transition to a
market economy and to the West” (Woodward, 1995, p. 1).
The most widely accepted explanation for this remains ethnic nationalism, or one of
its variants. Invariably, politicians and scholars point to the ethnic cleavages between
Serbs, Croats and Muslims that caused the war. Three variants o f this theme include,
first, the depth o f democracy that Dayton provides. Hayden (2005, p. 241), for example,
views Bosnia’s constitution as flawed because it was instituted from above with no
ratification by its constituent peoples, and that such a democracy is meaningless since the
ethnic groups do not agree on its fundamental composition. A second variant blames
Dayton’s consociational democracy because ethnic political elites have no common
loyalty (Belloni, 2004, p. 173). Third, Woodward suggests that since it is a system based
on ethnic rights, “it fails to resolve the core issues around which the war was fought”
(1997, p. 30).

Dayton's Origin
The Dayton Peace Accords were initialed on November 21, 1995, and signed later
that year in Paris on December 14. This peace protocol was the culmination o f Americanled negotiations in Dayton, Ohio, that ended a complex and costly four-year civil war in
Bosnia, a republic o f the former Yugoslavia. The struggle had killed 250,000 (Robinson
and Pobric, 2005, p. 237), displaced more than two million (Robinson and Pobric, 2005,
p.237), and caused 20 billion dollars in damage (World Bank, 1996). The framework
stopped the killing and established a crude plan to transform Bosnia into a liberal
democracy, essentially from scratch.
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According to Dayton’s terms, a sovereign Bosnia-Herzegovina would henceforth
comprise three constituent peoples^ in two entities: the Republika Srpska and the
Federation of Bosnia-Hercegovina. Croatians and Muslims would govern the Federation
while Serbs would govern the Republic. Governance at all levels would employ an
elaborate power-sharing scheme to ensure a balance o f ethnic power.
The US State Department authors began with a theoretical model conceived by
political scientist Arend Lijphart, known as consociational democracy. The theory’s
premise is that the mitigation o f divisive ethnic rivalries is possible when political elites
share power within a government that recognizes these rivalries and incorporates this
recognition into the political decision making processes. Over time, this ongoing
cooperation, although initially disingenuous, will prevent violence and ultimately bring
stability to divided societies. Consociational democracy relies on four principles o f power
sharing: a so called grand coalition (instead o f a majority), veto power for each group,
proportionality in the election system and civil service, and ethnic autonomy (Lijphart,
1979). Consociational concepts were not new and had been used previously in the
European Community system. Veto power, for example, is seen in the Luxembourg
Compromise which provides that "Where, in the case o f decisions which may be taken by
majority vote on a proposal o f the Commission, very important interests o f one or more
partners are at stake, the Members o f the Council will endeavor, within a reasonable time,
to reach solutions which can be adopted by all the Members o f the Council while

’ Bosnian Serbs, Croats and Muslims.
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respecting their mutual interests and those o f the Community". Taylor theorizes that the
consociational approach works because elites will acquiesce to the expansion of
supranational capacities in the hope o f securing overflow gains for their own constituency
(Taylor, 1994). In the case o f Bosnia, to meet the power sharing principle, two semiautonomous entities were created; the Federation o f Bosnia and Herzegovina,^ whose
majority is Muslim-Croatian and occupies 51 percent o f the country’s territory, and the
Republika Srpska, whose majority is Serbian, and occupies the remaining 49 percent.
This division closely matched the population breakdown. A census taken in 1991 showed
Bosnia’s population to be 44 percent Muslim, 33 percent Serb and 17 percent Croat
(Hayden, 2005). An elaborate set o f checks and balances were established to guarantee
equal political representation, and institutions were structured according to the principle
of ethnic proportionality and parity (Kasapovic, 2005). The final product provided a
government with five tiers: State, Entity, Canton, Municipality, and City. A separate
constitution is provided at each level. The government is intentionally weak at the top
level, with power distributed downward in order to facilitate as much ethnic self-rule as
possible.
None of the antagonists were satisfied with this final protocol. The Bosnian Serbs
held that their representatives at Dayton had very little input into the treaty's content, so

Text o f the Luxembourg Accords, from the Europa Glossary.
URL:http://europa.eu/scadplus/ glossary/luxembourg compromise en.htm
^ The Federation o f Bosnia-Herzegovina actually emerged from the 1994 Washington
Agreement; it was primarily a military collaboration against the Serbs. It was here also
that the 10 Cantons were first identified.
In 2001, the Bosnian Constitutional Court clarified that Serbs were a constituent
etimic group within the Federation, and that Muslims and Croats were a constituent
etiinic group within the Republika Srpska.
12

they remained utterly opposed to the entire proeess. The Bosnian-Croat representative felt
betrayed and resigned from offiee during the Dayton negotiations, and was not replaeed.
Bosnian Muslims argued that allowing the ereation o f the Republika Srpska entity
rewarded Serb exeesses. In general, at Dayton no effort had been made to resolve the
issues that started the war. It was as Alijia Izetbegovie deseribed, “an unjust peaee” {New
York Times, 1993). Ethnie nationalism was elearly the primary souree of politieal
instability and stalemate for the first deeade, or so, following Dayton. A multinational
NATO foree" was neeessary for the eontinued eessation o f hostilities. Responsibility for
eivilian implementation of Dayton was assigned to a new offiee that would be ealled the
High Representative, under the authority o f a Peaee Implementation Couneil o f 55
member eountries. A variety o f international institutions were also deeply involved.
These ineluded the United Nations Seeurity Couneil (UNSC), the Organization for
Seeurity and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the North Atlantie Treaty Organization
(NATO), the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the European
Bank for Reeonstruetion and Development (EBRD).
At the time, Dayton was hailed by its authors as a great aeeomplishment. A long-term
goal o f its eontributors was demoeratization. As U.S. Seeretary o f State Warren
Christopher remarked during the first initialing o f Dayton, “The agreement is a vietory
for all o f those who believe in a multi-ethnie demoeraey in Bosnia-Herzegovina” (New
York Times, 1995). Annex III o f Dayton direets the OSCE to promote free, fair, and
demoeratie eleetions and to lay the foundation for representative government and ensure
the progressive aehievement o f demoeratie goals throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina.

' ' Named IFOR - short for "Implementation Foree".
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Article I o f Bosnia’s State constitution reads, “Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be a
democratic state, whieh shall operate under the rule of law and with free and demoeratie
eleetions.” The G-7 Summit Chairman's Statement reads, “We eonfirm our support for
the Peaee Agreement and the establishment o f a demoeratie and pluralistie State of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, composed o f two Entities” (Lyons Summit Doeuments, 1996).
There was cautious optimism that external intervention would be needed for only a
short period o f time. In September 1996, Secretary o f State Warren Christopher was
confident enough to eomment that “the United States would now be able to withdraw its
peacekeeping troops from Bosnia by the end of the year as President Clinton promised”
{New York Times, 1996). In principle, its democratically elected leaders were to pursue
the objectives prescribed by Dayton with minimal external intervention. However, it was
immediately clear that this would not prove to be the case. In a classic example o f what
Schmitter and Karl (1991) term the “fallacy o f electoralism”, it was obvious that the
newly elected govermnent would be unable to funetion when ultra-nationalists Muslim
Alija Izetbegovie, Serb Momcilo Krajisnik, and Croat Kresimir Zubak were voted into
power. These were the same individuals that only months beforehand were orchestrating
the war. The Peace Implementation Council responded by exereising new expanded
powers through its High Representative and unilaterally enaeting reform. By early 1997,
the Dayton “voluntary” democratization and stabilization plan had mutated into a system
that would be “force-fed” to Bosnians from the outside.

14

Kosovo
In 1998, two years after Dayton, the disintegration of Yugoslavia restarted. Ethnic
fighting broke out in the Kosovo region o f the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
Hostilities arose between Serbian military and police forces, and secessionist ethnic
Albanians. The international community became alarmed when panic drove nearly one
million ethnic Albanian refugees into neigliboring countries (International Monetary
Fund, 1999). There was fear that hostilities would spread into neighboring countries with
large ethnic Albanian minority populations, such as Macedonia and Montenegro.
Although both sides were to blame for the conflict, Serbian forces were found to be using
excessively brutal tactics against civilians (King and Mason, 2006, pp. 43-45). When
attempted negotiations with Belgrade failed,'^ it was decided that the most expedient
solution was to use military force against Serbia. After a seventy-seven day NATO air
campaign, Serbian forces departed from the Kosovo region. The UN Security Council
subsequently deployed a long-term civil and security presence in Kosovo, under United
Nations oversight. As with the war in Bosnia, regional economic, humanitarian and social
costs of this war were staggering. Economic damage to Serbia alone was estimated at
roughly $30 billion (Group-17 Report, 1999).

A New Security Paradigm in the Balkans
When the Bosnian war began in 1992, there was little Western interest in committing
military assistance beyond providing humanitarian support. Warren Christopher,
commented that the United States “had no vital interests in Bosnia” {New York Times,

12

The negotiations are known as the Rambouillet Accords.
15

1993). This hesitation by the US to intervene occurred for several reasons. Soviet
domination of Eastern Europe had only recently ended, so there was no revised policy to
confront the new types o f emerging regional security issues. For forty years the W est had
followed a policy o f non-intervention in the Balkans. Also, there was significant in
fighting between America, France and Germany over which force should manage an
intervention, if there was to be one (i.e. the United Nations, NATO or a regional security
force led by the European Community, the Commission on Security and Cooperation in
Europe or the Western European Union). Russia was also exerting pressure on the US to
not take action against Serbia. Broadly speaking, these factors resulted in an overall lack
o f commitment by the United States and Europe that undermined effective peace-keeping
and umiecessarily prolonged the Bosnian war until Dayton in 1995 (Gow, 1997, p. 299).
A similar critical observation can be made regarding the war in Kosovo. American
and European policies were not designed for the events that unfolded after the fall of
communism. Once again. Western response to the growing crisis in Serbia did not
prevent a second war. It took this second humanitarian and security crisis to finally
“bring international attention back to this part of Europe” (Biermann, 1999, p.5). The
Euro-Atlantic community finally realized it had to accept that Europe, as a whole, had a
stake in the Balkans. Policies developed to manage the traditional interstate rivalries
between major military powers no longer functioned because these were no longer the
primary threats to regional peace. The international security paradigm had changed. The
tlireat in this region had shifted to the dangers o f fragmentation in states that were more
peripheral (Chandler, 2000, p. 22). Moreover, the concept o f “security threat” now began
to encompass not only violence, but advanced technological systems, hard drugs.
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HIV/AIDS, the permeability o f state borders, transnational refugee flows, economic
migrations, and the role of diasporas (Del Sarto, 2006, p. 508).

The Stabilization Pact for Southeastern Europe
Following Dayton, US and European policy toward Bosnia was based on the
assumption that the benefits o f closer trade ties with the EU would prove a more enticing
goal than continued nationalism. There was only an indetenninate prospect o f EU
membership for Bosnia. Incentives during this early period were vague, and failed to
motivate elites to follow a path o f democratization and reform on their own. By 1999,
political reforms vis-à-vis Dayton had lost traction. It was only after the war in Kosovo,
that both the EU and the United States fully realized their earlier policy weaknesses. One
result of this revelation was a fundamental policy shift in Europe's approach to security in
the Balkan region. Brussels realized that the American “policy o f emergency
reconstruction, containment and stabilization was not, in itself, enough to bring lasting
peace and stability to the area; only the real prospect o f integration into democratic
European structures would achieve that” (European Commission Report, 2002, p. 4).
Against the backdrop o f a second bloody entanglement in the region, a new strategy took
form in the Stabilization Pact for South Eastern E u r o p e a n d the EU’s Stabilization and
Association Process. From this point forward, Dayton took a back seat to the EU, which
then took the lead in administering Bosnia and preparing it for integration into EU
structures.

The Security Pact is now managed by the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
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A new foeus was placed on addressing “Europe’s stratégie shortfalls” (Stability Paet,
Seetion 1) of the past. In the Stability Paet, the EU reaffirmed its resolve to assume
responsibility for western Balkan stability, this time by offering to direet the eountries
toward what Chandler (2006, p. 35) terms “the pot o f gold that was held to eome with EU
membership”. Europe would aeeomplish this by making a eommitment to the western
Balkan e o u n t r i e s f o r an unambiguous and potentially aecelerated path to European
Union membership. Within one year, the countries were recognized as “potential
eandidates” for EU membership. In return for this commitment, the western Balkan
eountries agreed to eooperate with the terms o f the Paet. Heneeforth, integration with the
European Union was eonsidered a non-negotiable prerequisite for regional seeurity. The
hub o f the Pact was the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP), and a new category
of Stabilization and Assoeiation Agreement (SAA) that would be adapted to the needs of
each country. The SAA resembles the Europe Agreements coneluded with the countries
of central and eastern Europe.
Bosnia’s SAP involves multiple steps that include fulfillment o f the requirements o f
the EU Roadmap,'^ completion o f the action items of the European Commission
Feasibility S t u d y , a n d completion o f subsequent SAA negotiations. Once the SAA is
signed, its terms must then be implemented in order for Bosnia to be deemed a

The Western Balkan countries were Albania, Bosnia-Hercegovina, the Former
Yugoslav Republie o f Macedonia, and the Federal Republic o f Yugoslavia.
In 2000, an EU "Road Map" identified eighteen steps to be taken by Bosnia prior to
preparation o f the Feasibility Study for SAA negotiations.
In November 2003, the Commission presented
the Feasibility Study on the
i
preparedness o f Bosnia to negotiate a SAA.
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“candidate” for EU membership. After candidate status is acquired, the European Council
begins accession negotiations. These negotiations result in an Accession Agreement,
which requires European Parliament consent and unanimous European Council
agreement for final membership ratification. The EU policy mechanism linking this wide
range o f political and economic reform with progressively closer bilateral EU relations is
commonly termed “conditionality”. “Conditionality” relies on rewards and penalties
which are contingent upon the fulfillment o f certain political reforms such as those found
in the “Copenhagen Criteria” '^ and the Acquis Communitaire.’* Individual steps through
the process are administered through what is termed a European Partnership. The most
recent progress milestone for Bosnia was completed when the European Council
authorized the European Commission to open official SAA negotiations on November
25, 2005. In December 2007, the last remaining prerequisite for SAA initiation, namely
the replacement o f independent entity police forces with a single state force, was
tentatively met. It is anticipated that the SAA will be formally concluded in 2008.
Europe’s “conditionality” approach has been to compel Bosnia, through financial
assistance programs, trade privileges, peer pressure, and the authority of the High
Representative, to implement constitutional and legislative reforms that shift political
power from the entity to the state level and to create state level institutions that facilitate
an EU interface (Chandler, 2006, p. 36). As noted, these reforms have been primarily

The Copenhagen European Council, held in 1993, delineated the conditions for
European Union membership, which are now commonly known as the "Copenhagen
Criteria".
The Acquis Communitaire is the complete body o f common rights and obligations
that is binding on all the Member States o f the European Union,
http ://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/ glossary/terms/acquis_en.htm
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institutional in nature. They address refugee and displaced person returns, police re
organization at the state level, creation o f an impartial public media broadcasting sector,
administrative capacity building in the area o f customs and taxation, cooperation with the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), creating a single
economic space, and the labor market. The EU has chosen to address corruption only
indirectly. The development and implementation o f reform addressing the control o f
coiTuption has, for the most part, been left in the hands o f the Bosnians themselves.
Though some action has been taken, it has been mostly superficial. For example, the UN
Convention on Fighting Corruption was recently ratified, and a National Anti-Corruption
Strategy and action plan was established in 2006. As discussed in Chapter 5,
implementation o f these programs has been unsatisfactory. The 2007 and 2008 BosniaHerzegovina Progress Reports, published by the European Commission, also identify this
shortcoming.
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CHAPTER 3

DEMOCRACY AND LEGITIMACY
Pervasive corruption, as found in Bosnia, undemiines public faith in elected
government and the democratic system itself. For this reason, an understanding o f the
prerequisites for legitimacy and democracy are essential. Scholars view these two
concepts from many perspectives. They are neither absolute nor unchanging. They
continue to be influenced by contemporary and historical events, social conditions, and
research methodologies. Viewpoints developed in different eras often differ.
Contradictions emerge as time proves earlier assumptions wrong. The rights o f citizens as
conceived by Jeremy Bentham, for instance, are not considered democratic by today’s
standards. Moreover, controversies between authors often arise since the quality o f any
democracy is a value-laden subject (Diamond and Morlino, 2005, p. ix). Consequently, a
very large body o f work is available for study.
This chapter presents a small selection o f this literature relevant to concepts presented
herein. Lipset’s (1959, pp. 71-72) definition o f democracy serves as a suitable starting
point. Lipset wrote; “Democracy is a political system which supplies regular
constitutional opportunities for changing governing officials. It is a social mechanism for
the resolution o f the problem o f societal decision making among conflicting interest
groups which pennits the largest possible part o f the population to influence these
decisions through their ability to choose among alternative contenders for political
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office.” At the core o f Lipset’s definition are three simple dimensions: competition,
participation, and liberty. Yet, as plainspoken as this definition may appear, its true
meaning raises a number o f complex issues.

Democracy
This complexity, the idea o f “rule by the people”, has been has a source o f heated
debate for centuries. In his Republic, Plato criticized democracy, arguing that states
should be ruled by philosopher-kings. Less than one hundred years later, Aristotle, in The
Politics, suggested that the rule o f the many was the best governance system
(Morgenthau, 2004, p.67). In his Discourses on Livy, Machiavelli hinted at democratic
principles when he discussed the value o f dissension between plebeian and noble
factions. The period from the Renaissance to the eighteenth century saw the emergence o f
classical republicanism that rebelled against institutions claiming divine justification. The
sovereignty o f the monarch was replaced with the sovereignty o f the people. Such liberal
reasoning brought new democratic parliaments to England and Scotland. English political
culture at this juncture, however, did not encourage public input. There were no
opposition parties or public space in which political factions could openly compete and
exchange ideas (Zaret, 2000, p. 7). Secrecy, censorship, and privilege remained the norm
(Zaret, 2000, p. 8). The democracy debate expanded with philosophers such as Locke,
Mill, Rousseau and Kant who re-introduced the concept o f socioeconomic inequality. In
the nineteenth century a Marxist school o f thought emerged arguing that to achieve full
freedom capitalism should be replaced with communism. More recent contributions
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include theses by Lipset and Dahl, who argue that modernization and economic strength
are correlatives to democracy.
Many academics today frame their study o f democracy chronologically and
theoretically in relation to what Samuel Huntington (1991) termed, three “waves” o f
democratization. Huntington observed that the spread o f democracy was advancing and
receding cyclically over time. The first wave, spanning the years from 1828 to 1926,
comprised the United States since the presidency o f Andrew Jackson, the democratization
of Western Europe and colonies in Australia, Chile and Canada, and the democratization
of Eastern and Central Europe post-1918. This was followed by a reverse wave that
lasted from 1922 to 1942 and brought National Socialism to Germany, Fascism to Italy
and the spread o f the Third Reich. The second wave occurred between 1943 and 1962
and accounts for tbe democratization o f West Germany, Italy, Austria, South Korea and
Japan under occupation during and after World War Two. It also incorporates
democratization following decolonization o f India, Nigeria, Israel, Philippines and
Jamaica. This second wave is overlapped by another reverse wave that lasted from 1958
to 1975 and brought military regimes to much o f the third world o f that period. The third
wave began in 1974 and brought the fall o f communism in Europe, and the
democratization o f Spain, Greece and Portugal, and much o f Latin America, Asia and
Africa.
As more countries embraced and rejected democracy, researchers encountered an
increasing number o f complexities and contradictions. Collier and Levitsky (1997, p.
430), for example, identified references to hundreds o f democracy subtypes that differed
“profoundly both from each other and from the democracies in advanced industrial
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countries”. Authors shifted their attention from the sources o f transition to democracy
and looked toward the factors that sustained it (Diamond and Morlino, 2005, p. ix). The
early theory o f “modernization” was first seen as responsible for the success or failure of
a democracy (Evans and Whitefield, 1995, p. 485). Additional theories began to
encompass structural, economic, social, and cultural dimensions in addition to the narrow
institutional views o f scholars such as Joseph Schumpeter (Sorensen, 1998, p. 9).
Concepts such as “democratic consolidation” and what Saxonberg and Linde (2003) term
“transitology” emerged to capture the broad process o f sustaining and solidifying
democratic regimes.
The theory o f the "democratic peace" gained significant attention in the second half of
the nineteenth century. Empirical research has demonstrated that democratic states are
generally as conflict and war prone as non-democracies; and yet over the last two
centuries, they have rarely gone to war with one another (Moaz and Russett, 1993, p.l).

Legitimacy
The heart of democracy is “legitimation” according to Larry Diamond (1999, p. 65).
“Legitimation” refers to the process o f reaching the end product that democracy is
expected to produce. It is the degree o f fulfillment o f this expectation. Legitimacy is a
measure o f the effectiveness o f a govermnent system in terms o f meeting public
expectation. Effectiveness in this context means: public endorsement o f the political
mechanism and its ability to sustain balanced public decision making. In its ideal form, a
legitimate political regime exists when its citizens unconditionally submit to its rules and
procedures. This procedural order becomes the only horizon within which political actors
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act (Schmitter and Guilhot, 2000, p. 132). A characteristic o f democracy is that its
existence depends on legitimacy. The general consensus among academics is that there is
no universal formula for legitimacy. Each country must be evaluated within the bounds of
its own circumstances (Sorensen, 1998, p. 16).
Among the many legitimacy variables proposed are economic and social conditions,
beliefs and psychological attitudes, a capacity for empathy, the idea o f civic culture,
social structures, and political structures (Rustow, 1970, pp. 351-352). Research o f Asian
countries performed by Chu, Bratton, Lagos, Shastri and Tessler (2008) suggests that
political indicators such as trust in institutions and a fair electoral system have the most
influence on legitimacy, although economic factors should not be completely dismissed.
Citizens o f new democracies are able to discern political from economic elements of
regime performance. Here, legitimacy hinges on whether political institutions command
public trust. Rose, Mishler and H aef (1998) encountered similar results in their study o f
former East Block countries when they found that political factors mattered more than
economic factors in determining support for democracy. David Becker (1999) points out
that for new democracies, in the short term, legitimacy also includes fulfilling the
expectations o f those societal strata and interest groups that supported the previous
regime and still wield sufficient influence to hinder democratization. As an example, he
refers specifically to small but influential military, business sector and political elite
elements in Chile, Brazil, and Peru. Along these lines, Chang, Chu and Park (2007, p. 68)
add that robust legitimacy ultimately requires citizens to profess “authoritarian
detachment”, that is they must eventually reject non-democratic alternatives if for no
other reason than there are no preferable alternatives.
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In his study o f failing democracies in Latin America, O ’Domiell (2004, p. 10)
attributed a lack of legitimacy to high levels o f social inequality, which he believed
undermined the basic premise o f democracy, namely individual agency. Human agency
he reasoned is the grounding factor o f democracy. According to O ’Donnell, human
agency is not a privilege or a goal - it is a right o f all human beings. It is the highest
moral right, and is the foundation o f political life. He defines a human agent as “someone
normally endowed with sufficient autonomy for deciding what kind o f life is to be led,
has the cognitive ability to reasonably detect options available, and is responsible for the
courses o f action ultimately taken”. Within the context o f democracy, human agency can
be conceptualized as the potential o f group decision making through fair and
institutionalized elections that are bound within the laws o f the state. From this aggregate
perspective, agency is both a participatory right and a responsibility imposed on citizens
by the state. The state is thus presupposed to be both a territorial delimitation and a legal
system (O ’Donnell, 2004, p. 16).
O ’Donnell’s concept o f human agency logically leads to questions o f what are the
capabilities and range o f options available to the human agent and which conditions
enable or hinder an individual to function as an agent. In other words, what are the
reasonable bounds o f legitimacy? The answer lies in the origins o f civil law, for example
in the area o f contract and social welfare, both o f which rest on a basic criterion of
fairness; fairness being a corollary o f agency. O ’Donnell’s line o f reasoning is that the
state, as a legal system, ensures fairness by guaranteeing that humans are able to interact
with one another as equivalent agents without coercive influences on their agency, or
their range o f choices. It accomplishes this by providing necessary freedoms such as
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expression, association, and access to information. Human agency thus equates to
political citizenship legally enacted and backed. Moreover, to ensure fairness, there can
be no individual or institution that is legibus solutus, that is, above the law (O ’Donnell,
2004, p. 33). O ’Donnell summarizes by arguing that citizens exercise their human agency
through voting in fair elections. In doing so, they express their support for democracy’s
rules and procedures. Consequently, “it is these voting citizens who are the very source
and justification o f the authority needed to rule states and governments”. Democracy thus
logically precludes citizens from being treated as “subjects” or “supplicants o f the
goodwill o f the state” (O ’Donnell, 2004, p. 34).
Schmitter and Guilhot (2000, pp. 132-133) explain that for a democratic regime to
persist, rules and procedures must be put in place that facilitate the eligibility o f citizens
to participate in political decision making processes. These rules and procedures must
also chamiel the conduct of relevant actors. They must be seen as appropriate and
employed on a normal basis either because they are normative or because noncompliance involves higher costs than compliance. A democratic transition comprises
more than procedural attributes. It is an “actor-centered” process. In a similar line of
reasoning, Darren Hicks (2002, p. 225) suggests that the legitimacy o f a democratic
system rests on its commitment to public justification. That is, social and political
policies should be justified by reasons that can be accepted by all those affected. He
places the locus o f justification on stakeholders themselves through the mechanisms o f
representation and participation in civil society. Hicks (2002, p. 225) cites empirical
evidence that stakeholders who are able to participate in “collaborative processes” will
endorse decisions even at the cost o f their own interests. The term “collaborative
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processes” , in this context, refers to collective reasoning by citizens as moral and political
equals.
The concept o f legitimacy can be said to be embodied in the principle o f
“accountability”. By “accountability” Cullell (2005, p. 143) refers to the obligation of
elected officials to justify their decisions to citizens and the consequences o f this
justification. When working properly, accountability is a strong incentive for politicians
to be responsive to citizens. Accountability has two aspects: vertical and horizontal.
Vertical accountability refers to the tension that develops between electoral actors
(primarily citizens) and elected officials as a result o f political performance. It is most
frequently operationalized at election time when citizens either reward pleasing
perforaiance with reelection or punish displeasing performance by voting for alternate
candidates. Vertical accountability is also employed between elections when institutions
such as non-government organizations, social movements, and the media publicly hold
officials accountable for their decisions (Schmitter, 2005, p. 23). For the mechanics o f
vertical accountability to function, bona fide elections offering reasonable alternatives to
voters must be held (Diamond and Morlino, 2005 p. xix). Horizontal accountability refers
to the relationship that exists between elected officials and bodies such as counter
corruption agencies, the court system, and enforcement agencies that have authority to
independently scrutinize and circumscribe the power o f these officials. Diamond and
Morlino (2005, p. xxi) note that counter-corruption commissions are crucial for
contemporary democracies and emphasize that that they must possess sufficient power,
breadth and resources to execute credible and interlocking investigations, deter
temptation and try suspected offenders free from government interference.
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Based on the theories presented, for a democratic regime to be legitimate the
mechanics o f vertical and horizontal accountability must be operational. This leads to the
next discussion o f this chapter, namely the rule o f law. Legitimacy in the form o f vertical
and horizontal accountability must be enforced, hence the need for laws. For example,
voters and institutions demanding vertical punishment o f officials must be legally
protected from intimidation and retribution. Agencies need the authority and functional
legislation to aggressively prosecute law-breaking officials. But the rule o f law is more
than a collection o f legally enforceable rules to protect voters. The rule o f law in a
democracy is typically established in a document, such as a constitution, that represents
the highest law o f the land. Constitutions also establish the unit o f the polity, the citizen
(Becker, 1999, p. 141). Laws emanating from a democratic constitution apply universally
to all citizens. Thus, in addition to legislation, within a democracy the rule o f law implies
democratic behavior within an institutionalized system o f impartial rights both coveted
by citizens and respected in others. Moreover, this interplay o f rights motivates rational
individuals to circumscribe the rule-breaking o f other individuals. In this way, each
citizen has a stake in formulating and enforcing societal norms. In Europe this concept is
commonly termed “rechsstaat” or “constitutional state” (Donnelly, 2003, p. 64). As noted
above, it is from this principle o f universal and impartial rights that we derive the concept
that there can be no individual or institution that is legibus solutus, that is, above the law.
Legitimacy works much like a quality assurance standard that allows us to measure
the effectiveness of a democratic system. It establishes the bounds of acceptable political
behavior by those in power and also behavior of the governed. The following paraphrase
of Lipset summarizes the concept o f political legitimacy: for a government to be
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legitimized those out of power must adhere to decisions made by those in power, while
those in power must respect the rights of those out of power (Lipset, S. M. 1959). By this
he meant that democracy relies on a reciprocal balance o f power and responsibility
between the governed and the governors. It is thus reasonable to state that democracy and
legitimacy are mutually correlative.
In the case o f Bosnia, little democracy-oriented survey data is available for study.
However, the insight gleaned from what is available corroborates the findings o f this
thesis: namely widespread corruption and a poor opinion toward government
performance. According to the Early Warning System o f the United Nations
Development Program, public opinion surveys find that citizens still exhibit an obvious
reserve toward state authorities, and public support for all levels o f government is
consistently below 60 percent among citizens o f all three ethnic groups (United Nations
Development Program, 2004). In a 2004 public opinion survey performed by the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Mission in Bosnia, 80 percent o f
respondents responded that they could have no influence on what political parties and
politicians would talk about during the pre-election campaign and upcoming 2006
elections. A 2006 Open Society Fund Democracy Assessment in Bosnia found that 77
percent o f respondents thought the rule o f law operative at a very low or low level
throughout the country, 63 percent thought that public officials did not perform their
duties in accordance with transparency laws, 79 percent believed that confidence in the
country’s legal system was low or very low, 69 percent thought that the business sector
was insufficiently regulated in the public interest, 94 percent o f respondents said public
confidence in the effectiveness o f government and leadership was low or very low, 57
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percent believed there is significant influence o f paramilitary units, private amiies,
warlordism and criminal mafias on the country, 90 percent said the effectiveness o f the
separation o f public office from party advantage and the personal interests o f office
holders was low or very low, 86 percent believed that officials, companies and public
services were involved in corruption, 84 percent thought the extent o f citizen
participation in voluntary and self-management organizations was low or very low, 71
percent thought the access o f all social groups to public office and their representation in
the public life were insufficient; and 81 percent thought the accessibility o f elected
representatives to their constituents was low or very low (Open Society Fund, 2006).
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CHAPTER 4

POLITICAL ATTITUDE AND ALIENATION
This thesis posits that the influence o f corruption and poor govenunent performance
are causing political attitude to be transformed in Bosnia. Political attitude studies are a
subset of both public opinion studies and political psychology. The quantification and
operationalization of political attitude are often referred to as “political efficacy” . The
study o f political attitude involves investigating factors that influence political choice.
Political scientists, sociologists, and psychologists have each approached this research
from different perspectives and have produced a large body o f literature describing these
influences. Accordingly, this chapter examines political attitude for multiple reasons.
First, this thesis holds that if the political attitude o f Bosnian middle class is being
influenced by deeply entrenched corruption, there will be a negative impact on
democratization. Second, an affirmative political attitude or a certain level o f efficacy
across a population generally, is necessary (though not sufficient) for political legitimacy.
It is widely seen as a correlative to the stability and development o f political systems
(Chung-Li, 2003, p. 729). Third, political attitude, as expressed through opinions, is a
reasonable standard by which govenunent perfonnance can be measured. Public attitude
can also tell us what criteria citizens use to gauge govenunent perfonnance. Last, mass
political attitude possesses a dynamic that can influence political systems. Acquiring and
sustaining political power depends, in part, on the ability to influence public attitude and
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thus provide votes. Political opinion thus has the potential to influence legitimacy and
therefore democracy. Both Allport’s definition o f political attitude and Stewart’s
definition o f political efficacy serve as appropriate guides for this chapter. Political
attitude refers to “action or readiness for action with regard to a given issue on the part o f
members o f a public who are reacting in the expectation that others in the public are
similarly oriented toward the same issue” (Allport, 1936, p. 92). Political efficacy is the
dichotomous perception that “one has the necessary resources and skills to affect the
political process, and that this process responds to efforts to exert influence” (Stewart,
1992, p. 180).

Political Attitude
Political attitude is a transitory social phenomenon that aggregates individual
preferences and choices (Davison, 1958, p. 92). It is a combination o f emotional reactions
to the media, and interactions between individuals, real or imagined. It is reciprocal in
that it simultaneously reflects and influences the opinions o f a population. Welzel
observes that political attitude has a bonding effect on both individuals and members of
society. It consolidates social capital and allows individuals to “translate democratic
preferences into active support for democratic goals” (Welzel, 2007, p. 339). He suggests
tlxree normative types o f public attitude necessary for democracy (Welzel, 2007, p. 400).
First, there must be a widespread preference for democracy. Second, there must be wideranging communal attitudes. Third, broad emancipative attitudes are necessary because
the idea of people power is an implicit concept o f democracy. Muller and Seligson (1994,
p. 647) contribute interpersonal trust as a product o f democracy. Inglchart and Welzel,

33

(2005, p. 137) add self-expression values as one more mass attitude conducive to
democracy. Linz and Stephan (1996, p. 8) frame democratic legitimacy as a political
opinion.

Attitude Formation and Political Decision Making
Ideally, individuals would all make rational political decisions, in the sense that
thought would be unaffected by emotions or desires. It means the type o f political
thinking that everyone would exercise if our best interests were really known (Baron,
2000, p. 5). Clearly, this condition is far from reality. Social psychologists examine the
flaws in people’s reasoning when they make decisions, fonu beliefs and choose goals, in
areas o f life, such as politics. Kahneman and Tversky (1979), for example, proposed what
they termed prospect theory to explain how the descriptive framing o f risk causes people
to draw different conclusions for the same problem. They discovered that many
individuals, although they think they are acting in their own best interest, are in fact
doing the opposite.
Political scientist Peter Marris (2001, pp. 280-281) views belief formation as the
product o f a contest between substantive and political rationality. Substantive arguments
are those derived from rational enquiry, a notion sometimes referred to as deliberative
democracy, while political rationality is based upon greed, prejudice and self-interest.
Marris argues that political rationality dominates the political world because rational
procedures o f discovery are not adaptable to public debate. Still, substantive rationality
can occasionally influence public opinion. As an example, he notes how public awareness
o f global warming has changed public perceptions o f the environment (Marris, 2001, p.
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281). Chung-Li (1994) hypothesizes that political attitude is dependent upon socio
economic status and subjective cognition o f politics. In his study o f a New Orleans,
Louisiana mayoral election, social background conditions, notably race, were the key
explanatory variables for political orientation. Harris (1991) posits that religion can act as
a resource for political mobilization. In his study o f political participation among churchgoing African Americans in Chicago, Illinois, he found that religious beliefs and
practices facilitate psychological resources for individual and collective political action.
Building on Noelle-Neumaim’s (1993) spiral o f silence theory, which holds that fear
of social isolation is the compelling force behind aggregate changes in public opinion,
Scheufele and Eveland (2001) posit that the distribution o f public opinions in a
population influences individual political participatory behavior. The spiral o f silence
theory holds that individuals continually scan public opinion on controversial issues and
tend to remain silent about their own political opinions when they perceive themselves to
be in the minority. In the long run, this creates the impression that the majority opinion is
stronger than it really is. Scheufele and Eveland pursued this line o f reasoning in their
research, and found that public opinion perceptions, group membership, media use, and
interpersonal discussion do influence political participation for some subgroups of
society. In their investigation o f Canadian federalism and political efficacy, Stewart,
Komberg, and Acock (1992) found that institutional contexts o f its federal system
affected Canadian political attitude, as reflected in different levels o f external and internal
efficacy structured along federal and provincial dimensions.
Sociologists Sutherland and Tanenbaum (1984) suggest that individual political
preferences are strongly related to rational views about how society functions. They find
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political preferences strongly linked with ideologies o f what is possible to accomplish in
society. Miller and Krosnick (2004) identified the level o f political participation changes
when individuals or groups are confronted with and seek to avert political threat that may
affect material s e lf interest or well being. In a condition not unlike Olsen’s free-rider
syndrome, Latane (1981) argues that individuals may decrease their political participation
when they believe they belong to a group with a similar political agenda. In her attempt
to validate claims that crowded ghetto living was instrumental in starting civil disorders,
Susan Welch (1976) found that physical crowding o f people showed effects on political
aggression, especially under conditions where negative attitude toward government were
preexisting.

Political Alienation
A consequence o f poor political attitude, or low political efficacy, is that individuals
become estranged from their government. Political alienation is a construct used by many
sociologists and political scientists to describe this variant o f political behavior. There is a
long tradition in its study. Theorists in the Marxist tradition, for example, hold that
political alienation is created when institutions and politicians extract power from citizens
and subsequently reassert that power in the fomi o f policies having a negative impact on
those from whom power was derived in the first place (Seeman, 1959, p.783). Emile
Durkheim’s (1912) Elementary Fonns o f Religious Life is another early essay on
alienation (Gabel, 1984, p. 179). For the purposes o f this study we define political
alienation as a type o f individual or group attitude that results from a perception o f poor
govermuent perfonnance combined with low levels o f political efficacy.
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From the term alienation, a broad meaning can be inferred. Alienation implies an
ideal standard o f attitude or level o f efficacy, an individual ought to possess, and that this
level does not exist in the alienated. Finifter (1970, p. 64) distinguishes four
manifestations o f political alienation. First, individuals may have a feeling o f political
powerlessness, in which the actions o f the government are not subject to their influence.
Second, there can be a perception of political meaninglessness. In this case, individuals
detect no recognizable predictability in decisions and policies. Consequently government
decisions are seen as in ational and unusable. Thirdly, citizens sense a departure from
established political norms, for instance when politicians violate the law in the course o f
their duties. Fourth, there can be a feeling o f “political isolation” wbere an individual
believes existing political practices are unfair, illegitimate, or fraudulent. Seeman (1959,
p.789) provides a fifth variant - self estrangement. Here, an individual can become
estranged from a normal human condition, for instance loss o f pride in work.
Weatherford (1991, p. 150) suggests that the legitimacy-attitude nexus exists at two
dimensions: individual and macro. At the macro level, legitimacy is said to exist if
constitutional guarantees of representation and system stability exist. Popular support is
not in the equation. At this level, legitimacy is not defined by popularity but by bow well
officials act in the polity’s best interest. At the individual level, he posits personal
feelings of alienation as a factor. Individuals manifest two types o f alienation: input
alienation, which is recognizable by symptoms o f diminished political and citizen
involvement, and output alienation, which results in suspicion and cynicism. Converse
(1972) attributes group alienation to increased levels o f education. Education increases
people’s political awareness. It is often accompanied by a shift toward more liberal

37

viewpoints and thus a demand for government to solve social problems. When this does
not occur as expected, people become alienated.
Theorists generally propose one of three broad effects o f political alienation: either
reduction in political participation, participation in constructive radicalism, or anti
democratic radicalism. Certain voting behavior or massive protests may be employed to
demonstrate disapproval with government policy or poor social conditions. Macke (1979,
p. 77) contends that alienation at the individual level is not necessarily a determinant o f
matching group-level response. In his study o f political alienation in the United States,
Templeton (1966) found that political alienation was a predictable cause o f withdrawal
from political participation. Alienated citizens may become disinterested in political
parties or refuse to vote. Macke (1979, p. 78) finds it a correlative o f social discontent
and perceived economic conditions. She also found that, during periods o f high
alienation, voters do not necessarily “redress their grievances by voting incumbents out
o f office”, but rather are more likely to “use more indirect pressures” Macke (1979, p.
87).
Some theorists hold that alienation can result in anti-democratic modes o f political
behavior. Gusfeld (1962, p. 21) argues that groups that become disconnected from social
structures and norms are capable o f extremist political behavior. In an examination of
American radical right ideology, Abcarian and Stanage (1967, p.788 and p.792) found
alienation a source o f political activism and charismatic identification. In a similar study,
Powell (1986, p. 371) found the strength o f extremist parties a barometer o f political
alienation. Similarly, Muller, Jukam, and Seligson (1982, p. 257) argue that an extreme
form o f alienation can be an incentive for various forms o f politically aggressive
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behavior. Sallach, Babchuk and Booth (1972, p. 891), in their study o f alienation, found
that the powerless are very likely to depart from normal participation, namely voting, and
join in extremist behavior. There also is evidence that the alienated can be drawn to the
polls by an extremist demagogue. Mason and Jaros (1969, pp. 495-496) present evidence
demonstrating that, under certain circumstances, the alienated are more likely to support
extreme, politically disruptive candidates.
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CHAPTER 5

CORRUPTION AND LEGITIMACY
The previous chapter established a link between democracy, public opinion and
legitimacy. In this next chapter, the linkage is examined in more detail. Because the
corruption-legitimacy link in Bosnia forms the basis o f this thesis, the specific impacts of
corruption on political attitude and legitimacy are now explored. This chapter begins by
describing how perceptions o f corruption have evolved over time and provides a review
of relevant literature and a discussion o f how these effects are expressed through public
attitude. It then follows with a detailed profile o f Bosnia’s modem corruption record. The
following simple definition of corruption by Robert Klitgaard (1998, p. xi) is provided as
a point of departure: “Corruption exists when an individual illicitly puts personal interests
above those of the people he or she is pledged to serve.”

Perceptions o f Corruption
Corruption is a topic of contradictions. It is very difficult to define precisely, and can
be viewed from both a moral and legal perspective. It is often agreed to be a conditional
concept, yet it has rarely been viewed as ideal behavior. Historically, it has never been
the policy o f Western civilization to encourage corruption as an open and elemental part
in its society or economy. In the history o f Western thought, the wrongness o f corruption
is more widely agreed upon than any other tenet o f good governance (Meyer, 1975, p.
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62). As early as 1300 BC we find laws forbidding it. An edict o f Pharaoh Horemheb
proclaimed that any judge accepting a reward from a litigant while failing to hear the
defendant was guilty o f a crime against justice and subject to capital punishment (Martin,
1999). In the sixth century BC, Athenian law prohibited bribery. “If any Athenian
accepts a bribe, or him self offers one to another or corrupts anyone with promises to the
detriment o f the people or o f any o f the citizens individually, by any means or device,
himself and his children and his property will be confiscated” (Demosthenes XXI). Plato
forbids corruption in The Laws. Under the Roman Twelve Tables, a judge convicted of
bribery would suffer capital punishment (Peck, 2007). A later Roman law known as the
Lex Julia de Repetundis required that a judge convicted o f bribery suffer expulsion from
the senatorial order or exile (Plescia, 2001).
Corruption is also viewed as destructive by the three great revealed religions. Islam
teaches that bribes are not permissible. Mohammed “cursed the one who offers the bribe,
the one who receives it, and the one who arranges it” (Islam Basics, 2008). The Old
Testament frequently addresses the crime o f bribery. “And you shall take no bribe, for a
bribe blinds the clear-sighted and subverts the cause o f those who are in the right”
(Exodus 23:8) and “For I know how many are your transgressions and how great are your
sins, you who afflict the righteous, who take a bribe, and turn aside the needy in the gate”
(Amos 5:12). In the New Testament, Judas betrays Jesus for a bribe and the priests bribe
the guards at Jesus’ tomb in order to persuade them to lie about the resurrection (Matthew
27). The Ottomans viewed bribery as a form o f corrupt governance that necessitated the
punishment o f guilty official and unofficial power-holders (Ergene, 2001, p. 59). Under
the Magna Carta o f 1215 the English king's officials were prohibited from taking
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commodities without paying for them in an attempt to eradicate corruption. Corruption
was an important concern o f early American political philosophy. In his notes from the
Constitutional Convention, James Madison recorded that 15 delegates employed the temi
corruption no less than 54 times in the context o f presidential elections, impeachment,
multiple office holding, and the dependency o f one arm o f government upon another
(Savage, 1994, p. 177). In late Victorian England, the phenomenon o f selling peerages
was viewed as corrupt, especially in the Lloyd George era (Hanham, 1960, p. 277).
Today, international treaties forbidding bribery in business have been signed by all
Western countries. Extensive anti-corruption legislation exists within most countries and
the European Union has also enacted comprehensive anti-corruption policies.
Yet, despite this seemingly strong moral aversion to the idea o f corruption, it has been
and remains pervasive and deeply embedded in political systems in much o f the world.
Corruption by a few special interests is found in all societies no matter what their form o f
govenunent (Huntington, 1991, p. 27). Corruption is a part o f human society, found in
countries large and small, rich and poor, developed or not (World Bank, 2007). In some
developing countries illicit payments may equal a large fraction o f GDP (Shleifer and
Vislmy, 1993, p. 599). Corrupt public officials constitute one o f the most hannful
problems facing governments in developing countries (Klitgaard, 1998, p. 6). Corruption
has been widely associated with African etlmic violence in the past decade (Diamond,
2002). In the post-communist countries o f Europe, corruption remains a serious problem
even after EU membership (Reed, 2007). EU progress reports on would-be members,
notably in the Western Balkans, continually identify corruption as rampant. The informal
realities o f norms fail to track fonual written law. This contradiction raises interesting
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issues which have attracted academics to develop theories o f its causes and
consequences.
Economists have consistently argued that corruption slows economic growth and
retards foreign direct investment. It denies much-needed revenue to govermuents,
increases transaction costs, reduces productivity, reduces incentives, and affects equitable
distribution (Perkins, et al, 2001, p. 162). Political scientists, on the other hand, have not
always held such a rigid viewpoint. Joseph Nye (1967, p.419), for example, suggested
that corruption promotes economic development because it is an important source of
capital when governments lack the capacity to tax a surplus, cuts red tape and overcomes
the shortcomings o f inadequate administrative resources, provided a means o f
overcoming racial discrimination by allowing minority groups “access to the political
decisions necessary for him to provide his skills”, helps overcome divisions within ruling
elite, and helps ease the transition from traditional to modem society. Neo-Marxists of
the 1970s viewed cormption as a by-product o f capitalist democracy and the international
capitalist system in which lower-class groups are exploited (Montinola and Jackman,
2002, p. 149).
Samuel Huntington (1968, p. 113) wrote that “corruption provides immediate,
specific, and concrete benefits to groups which might otherwise be thoroughly alienated
from society. Cormption may thus be functional to the maintenance o f a political system
in the same way that reform is”. Other political scientists such as Waterbury (1973), Leys
(1987), Werner (1989), and Becquart-Leclerq (1989) have, in the past, argued its positive
aspects. Heidenheimer (2004) suggests that cormption is often framed in terms o f the
values o f particular local and ethnic communities. As examples, he described how there
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were eities and areas o f the 20”’ eentury United States where mayors and eongressmen
eontinued to be reeleeted even though their loeal, regional and state peers had repeatedly
labeled and eondemned them as eorrupt. Seligson (2002, p. 409) observed that during the
cold war the United States and its allies tolerated eorrupt regimes in the third world, so
long as those regimes were joined in the struggle against communism. Today, however,
most academics overwhelmingly do agree that, though it is often tolerated, corruption has
a destructive effect on both society and govermnent.
Corruption has been found to undermine accountability, opemiess, and equality
Corruption severs citizens from collective decision making, the very link that defines
democracy (Warren, 2004, p. 328). Corruption reduces support for democracy in both
mature and newly established democracies (Anderson and Tverdova, 2003, p. 91). It
undermines governance, economic growth, and, ultimately, the stability o f countries and
regions (Spector, 2005, p. 7). Corruption introduces fundamental economic distortions
that include impacting supply and demand, reducing foreign investment, reducing
efficiencies, and excessive public infrastructure. Countries are poorer overall when
corruption levels are high (Rose-Aekennan, 1999, p. 3). Social impacts o f corruption
include criminal activity, reduction o f work ethic, enviromnental hann, and decreased
political legitimacy. Corruption is inherently contradictory to and irreconcilable with
democracy (Transparency International, 2006).
Anderson and Tverdova's (2003) analysis o f 16 democracies connected levels o f
corruption with perceptions of government performance and trustworthiness. The authors
consistently found that corruption leads people to believe that their political system
perfonns worse than it could and was not trustworthy. Werner (1983, p. 149) theorizes
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that the dysfunctionality due to corruption would be increased by spillover effects
whereby corruption grows and affects increasing portions o f society. Spillover effect is
most evident when leaders become corrupt. Here, corruption affects the “trust, loyalty,
and personal integrity of their followers”, in other words, corruption affects legitimacy.
Patrick Dobel (1978) wrote that corruption was a source o f decay o f trust, loyalty and
concern among citizens. Dobel theorized that corruption is an inverse function o f moral
loyalty, which is necessary for a stable political order. Loyalty is thus an important aspect
o f legitimacy. Dobel suggested that it is the extensive inequality resulting from wealth,
power and status, originating in selfishness and pride that generates corruption. Members
o f the elite who exchange their own loyalty to society for self gain undermine the loyalty
given to them by the general citizenry. Without civic loyalty individuals cannot employ
self-discipline to suppress “self-interested desires” ; thus legitimacy and democracy
decline (Dobel, 1978, p. 960).
Seligson (2002) separates “legitimacy” into five dependent variables: the guarantee o f
a fair trial, respect for political institutions, pride for the political system, support for the
political system, and trust in police. When controlling for demographic and
socioeconomic factors o f gender, age, education, income, and party affiliation, Seligson’s
findings refute the functional view o f corruption. According to Seligson, higher
con*uption is significantly associated with lower support for legitimacy in each country.
Furthermore, legitimacy and interpersonal trust are also correlated in three o f the four
countries. Seligson concludes that individuals personally experiencing corruption may be
less likely to be trusting, a contributor to legitimacy. Canache and Allison (2005) also
examined the relationship between corruption and citizen support for incumbent
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governments in Latin America. Their findings again demonstrate that when citizens
perceive political corruption, there is a corresponding decline in opinion o f both political
officials and institutions. Mishler and Haerpfers (1998) found in their cross-national
study o f Central and East European states that higher levels o f corruption correlated to
lower levels o f regime support. Mishler and Rose (2001) found that higher levels o f
corruption were related to lower levels o f political trust in their study o f East Central
European States. Mungui-Pippidi (2003) observes that in Eastern and Central Europe,
corruption linked to everyday life and the public services administered by the state are the
most burdensome to citizens. In these post-communist countries the politicization o f lowlevel state jobs “runs deep” since political parties support a “wide range o f cronies”
(Mungui-Pippidi 2003, p. 81). Moreover, corrupt favors may be used to acknowledge or
establish superior social status amongst what Max Weber termed “status societies”
(Mungui-Pippidi 2003, p. 82). In such instances, financial gain may not be the motivator;
however, such situations undermine public trust and collective action and encourage
cynicism (Mungui-Pippidi 2003, p. 82).
A fundamental premise o f democracy is that, through human agency, citizens are able
to influence the political decision making process (O’Donnell, 2004). In a democracy,
corruption interferes with human agency because it causes the system to shift from being
one o f representation to one o f dependence. Corruption breaks the link between the
people’s power to vote and collective decisions (Warren, 2004, p. 328). It reduces
political competition and undermines popular political participation. Support for popular
opposition parties can decline due to the fear o f intimidating cronies. There is also a loss
of confidence in civil society with less motivation to form independent political
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organizations. Because it occurs in secret, corruption undermines fairness and trust. Trust
facilitates human association and helps establish a union between political institutions
and citizens. Trust encourages sociability and participation with others and enriches
interpersonal ties (Sztompka, 1999, pp. 24-30). Corruption erodes the rule of law, and as
the rule o f law recedes, so do accountability, responsiveness, freedom and political
equality (Merkel and Croissant, 2004, p. 201).
Perceptions o f corruption can alienate voters and affect electoral outcomes. In his
study o f the effects o f electoral fraud in Mexico, McCann and Dominguez (1998, p. 499)
found that widespread suspicions o f corruption affected electoral outcomes by making it
less likely that potential opposition supporters would vote. This was because they thought
voting under such circumstances was a waste o f time. This weakening o f the opposition
impeded the democratic alternation o f power. Unwittingly, opposition leaders may
discourage their own voters if they overemphasize corruption in their reformist agendas.
In their study o f democratic commitment in transition societies, Evans and Whitefield
(1995) predicted that the consequences o f individual experience with such factors as
corruption would impact public attitude and behavior. They suggest that the performance
of new political institutions produces perceptions of the workings o f democracy. Results
of their survey supported their hypothesis. They found a clear connection between
political factors and commitment to democracy.
Johnson, in his study o f political instability in Latin America, observes that public
fiscal dishonesty encourages tax evasion and inefficient use o f capital. According to
Johnson, capital is typically hoarded and invested in prestige items or usury with
proceeds hidden from taxation or concealed abroad. Also, local value systems sustain
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these corrupt practices, inhibiting socioeconomic improvements. This, in turn, causes
frustration, political alienation and instability (Johnson, 1964). In their study o f postSoviet Ukraine, Round, Williams and Rodgers (2008), demonstrate how corruption can
creep into the workplace. They observe how bribes have to be paid by individuals to
obtain employment. Salaries are paid informally to avoid taxation. This informal salary
system facilitates the exploitation o f workers and drives them to the surreptitious
eeonomic seetor. Jong-Sung and Khagram (2005) find that eoiTuption inereases
inequality, whieh in turn fosters a norm o f eorruption as aeeeptable behavior. The proeess
manifests a vieious inequality-eoiruption-inequality circle.

A Decade o f Corruption
There is a substantial body o f evidenee proving that endemie eorruption has
continued unabated in Bosnia since Dayton. Mueh o f this corruption is a continuation of
war profiteering and black-market aetivity that began during the war. In the first few
years after the war, criminal elements on all sides gained control o f what was left o f the
Bosnian economy. A wealthy and elite class o f power brokers thus emerged, which now
hinders reform efforts (Singer, 2000, p.32.). Richard Holbrooke, designer o f Dayton,
charaeterized these individuals as “erooks pretending to be nationalists” (Agenee Franee
Press, 2000). Mungiu-Pippidi (2003) eoneludes that eorruption o f a magnitude suffieient
to plague an entire society may not be eaptured by the normal theoretieal model. She
writes that the coneept o f corruption itself “does not sufficiently deseribe the
politieization o f an entire state administration that functions only when palms are
greased” (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2003, p. 80). Consequently, Bosnian institutions of
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accountability simply do not seem to perform as they do in Western countries. She also
concludes that “business-related corruption may involve the most money”, but it is
“corruption linked to everyday life and the public services the state administration is
supposed to deliver” that is the most burdensome to citizens (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2003, p.

8iy
The international community’s attention was first drawn to corruption’s seriousness
when a 1999 New York Times article alleged that one billion dollars in international
construction aid had gone missing (New York Times, 1999). The missing funds were
supposed to have funded the reconstruction o f roads, buildings, and schools as well as
provide municipal services throughout Bosnia. Since then, non government organizations
and government agencies have regularly published reports documenting the extent o f the
problem, each warning that it tlireatens long-term political stability. The following
paragraphs list relevant quotes from a small selection o f these documents. They also
include several high-profile corruption related prosecutions and news articles. All
illustrate the seriousness and extensiveness o f the corruption problem in Bosnia.

Bosnia's 1998 through 2008 Corruption Profile
1998; A country assessment project sponsored by the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) summarized the extent o f corruption in BiH as
follows: “For the economic and democratic development o f Bosnia and Herzegovina to
succeed, the large-scale fraud and corruption in the government must be reduced
substantially. Bank fraud, customs fraud, tax fraud, procurement fraud, bribery, extortion
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and an active organized crime network severely undermine economic and democratic
reforms” (USAID, 1998).
1999: The Office o f the High Representative Anti Crime and CoiTuption Unit
Comprehensive Anti-Corruption Strategy for Bosnia states: “Three years after the
implementation o f the Dayton Peace Accord, the attention o f the international community
has focused with increasing intensity on the endemic fraud and corruption in Bosnia and
Herzegovina” (OHR, 1999). In his September 1999 address before the US House o f
Representatives International Relations Committee, David Dlouhy, Director o f the US
State Department’s Office o f Bosnia, stated that “the problem o f corruption is undeniably
one o f the prime obstacles to achieving the goals set forth at Dayton” (Dlouhy, 1999).
2000: Harold J. Johnson, o f the Govermnent Accounting Office''^ (GAO), in
testimony before the U.S. Congress, stated that “there is a near consensus opinion among
officials that endemic crime and corruption in Bosnia is threatening the successful
implementation o f the Dayton Peace Agreement” (Johnson, 2000). That same year, in an
article published in the World Policy Journal, Peter Singer wrote “Many o f the Bosnian
Political Leaders derived their power from their positions at the helm o f sophisticated
war-profiteering operations that continue to dominate the black market - an underground
economy that still makes up roughly 50 percent o f the economy as a whole” (Springer,
2000, p. 32).
2001 : A World Bank corruption study published this year concluded that “the
corruption pattern in BiH is characterized by (a) high level o f public concern with
corruption, (b) low level o f public trust in the govermnents, (c) state capture and conflict

Harold Johnson was Associate Director, International Relations and Trade Issues,
National Security and International Affairs Division.
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o f interest, (d) public administration inefficiencies reflected in widespread bribery in
public offices, (e) distorted business environment, (f) a significant burden on poor
households, exacerbating poverty and inequality” (World Bank, 2001). A report prepared
by the European Stahility Initiative determined that “The lack o f governance capacity, the
depth o f the economic crisis, the level o f corruption and the weakness o f public
institutions risk undermining the long-term stahility o f the country” (ESI, 2001, p. 22).
Also this year, a perceptions survey^® conducted by USAID on corruption among public
officials in Bosnia and Herzegovina showed that 45 to 55 percent o f respondents felt that
corruption among doctors was widespread (USAID, 2002). Transparency International’s
2001 Global Corruption Report states that in the former Yugoslavia “corruption remains
rampant and an integral part o f doing business” (Transparency International, 2001, p.
124).
2002: In his 2002 inaugural speech. High Representative Lord Paddy Ashdown
commented that “the grip o f criminality and corruption is strengthening” (OHR, 2002).
Later this year, the annual Nations in Transit Country Report, published by the United
Nations, concluded that “corruption is a key obstacle to economic reform and the
establishment o f the rule of law in Bosnia” (United Nations, 2002, p. 122). Transparency
International’s first Corruption Perception Study for Bosnia found corruption the second
most serious problem in Bosnian society (Transparency International, 2002, p. 23). A
public opinion survey performed by the International Institute for Democracy and
Electoral Assistance found corruption the second issue o f concern in Republika Srpska
(IDEA, 2002, p.6).

As quoted in Governance and Corruption in Public Health Care Systems, Maureen
Lewis. Center for Global Development Working Paper No. 78 January 2006.
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2003; Paddy Ashdown, Bosnia’s fourth High Representative, foreed Mirko Sarovie,
the president o f Republika Srpska, to resign beeause o f eorruption allegations (Chandler,
2006, p. 86). Later that year, Mila Gadzie was also foreed to resign as Minister o f Foreign
Trade and Eeonomie Relations in the state government for similar reasons (Chandler,
2006, p. 86). A World Bank survey this year, evaluating the pereeption o f eorruption
among business managers, public officials, and the general public, observed that fifty
pereent o f publie offieials admitted aecepting bribes in exehange for altering the eontent
of legislation; one-third noted that eolleagues who refused bribes were marginalized and
sometimes even forced to quit (United Nations, 2003).
2004: Transparency International’s second Corruption Perception Study for Bosnia
found that political parties “calling for anti-corruption measures were doing so just for
the sake of eleetions while their main goal was to assume eontrol o f eorruption ehannels
from previous governments” and that “90 pereent o f BiH eitizens found themselves very
mueh affeeted by eorruption and pereeive it in almost all spheres o f their day-to-day life
and work” (Transparency International, 2004). A separate opinion poll performed by
Transpareney International showed that 93.7 percent o f the University o f Banja Luka^
students believed that there was eorruption at the faeulties in Banja Luka, with nepotism
at exams the most eommon fonn o f eorruption, followed by bribing professors at
admission exams (One World Southeast Europe, 2004).
2005: A eorruption study published by the Christian Miehelsen Institute found that
“eorruption is rampant in all spheres o f publie and political life in Bosnia and
Herzegovina” and that “eorruption exists in all its faeets - bribery, nepotism.

Banja Luka is the eapitol o f Republika Srpska.
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embezzlement, diversion o f public funds, tax fraud, illegal rent seeking, kick-back
schemes etc.” (CMI, 2005). Corruption is cited as a problem for doing business by 45
percent o f respondents, especially large companies, in the 2005 World Bank Business
Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (World Bank, 2005). A survey
sponsored by the International Finance Corporation found that 25 percent o f firms in
Bosnia identified corruption as a major constraint and 70 percent expected to give gifts in
meetings with tax officials (International Finance Corporation, 2005). Also this year,
Radojka Prastalo, a representative o f the Bosnian Serb association o f professors, stated
publicly that "incompetent and immoral individuals have turned Bosnian universities into
places where you can buy diplomas, titles and professions" {Mail and Guardian, 2005).
2006: The 2006 World Bank Worldwide Aggregate Governance Indicator for Control
o f Corruption shows no change for Bosnia between 1996 and 2006 (World Bank, 2007).
A survey performed by the GfK Centre for Market Research found that 58 percent o f
Bosnians felt that bribes were an absolutely natural part o f life, and that 93 percent
believed they lived in a corrupt state (GfK Centre, 2006). A fonner member o f the
Bosnian presidency, Dragan Covic, was convicted this year and sentenced to five years in
prison for his involvement in organized crime and tax evasion (Freedom House, 2007).
The sixty-second Rose-Roth Seminar held in Tirana, Albania concluded that “the
persistence o f corruption at various levels o f their societies, as well as the strength o f
organized crime networks througliout the region, was the most serious challenge in the
Balkan region” (NATO, 2006). In Transparency International’s 2006 amiual Corruption
Perception Index, BiH shared 93rd to 98th place out o f 163 countries with a score o f 2.9
out o f 10. This ranked the country among the most corrupt countries in the world
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(Transparency International, 2006). Also this year, the 2006 South-East Europe
Barometer found that over 85 pereent o f the population believed eorruption was eommon
in the medical profession, and among private officials, judges and public prosecutors,
members of parliament, customs officials, and police (Europe Barometer, 2006). The
World Bank reported that “persistent difficulties in political uncertainty and corruption
are some of the key constraints to business development and investment” (World Bank,

2006).
2007; Transpareney International’s 2007 National Integrity System Study o f BosniaHerzegovina concluded that eorruption thrives at higher political and administrative
levels, and is pervasive at the loeal level (Transpareney International, 2007). A 2007
Balkan-wide Gallup survey showed that in Bosnia and Herzegovina 86 pereent think
eorruption is widespread in business and 81 pereent think eorruption is widespread in
government (Gallup, 2007).
2008; In an interview, former High Representative Paddy Ashdown said: "We
lovingly forget that item number one is always the rule o f law. It is not eleetions. I'm
afraid. If you have eleetions before you establish the rule o f law then all you do is elect
the criminals who ran the war. What you create is not a democracy but a criminally
eaptured space. That is what we had in Bosnia. Corruption is now in the marrow and
hone of Bosnian society" {Sydney Morning Herald, 2008). In what is touted to be the
most comprehensive and thoroughgoing examination o f the social and political health o f
BiH ever, the United Nations Development Programme concluded that Bosnians “are not
interested in de-mining, prosecuting war-eriminals, police reform and defense issues.
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Instead they opt for improvements in their living standards, a unified country and anti
corruption measures” (United Nations, 2008).
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CHAPTER 6

QUALITATIVE INTERVIEWS
Qualitative in-depth field interview techniques are applied in this study. Several
factors led to this choice of research method. Initial research did not begin with an
articulated hypothesis. The original intent o f the researcher was to explore factors
affecting personal political loyalties and then develop a hypothesis from the subsequent
data. However, this approach changed during the interviews when a majority of
participants commented that political loyalties were secondary to concerns about political
ethics. Qualitative methods were deemed appropriate given the subjective nature of
political attitude and the corruption-legitimacy link. Bosnian nornis and culture are often
far removed from Europe and the United States. It was felt that in-depth interviews might
provide a hitherto unexploited opportunity for insight into Bosnian political psychology.
Qualitative results might also complement preexisting quantitative data. It was hoped that
this approach would deepen understandings o f Bosnian political attitude and, at the same
time, provide a testing ground for the qualitative perspective.^^

It is worth noting that that the researcher lived and worked in Sarajevo from 1996
to 1998 and has stayed in close contact with several Bosnians since then. This long-term
stay familiarized the researcher with Bosnian viewpoints and for the purposes off this
paper “facilitated the differentiation o f what is valid information from what is not” (Pelto
and Pelto, 1978).
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Interviews Versus Surveys
Schutt (2006, p. 268) identifies several advantages o f in-person interviews. First,
from a practical standpoint, personal perspectives generally foster a greater understanding
than those acquired from structured survey interviews and questionnaires. Second,
personalized interviews are known to result in higher question response rates. Third, the
physical and social circumstances o f an interview can be controlled by the researcher, and
responses can be probed and clarified. Surveys also present a host o f problematic
phenomena such as response instability and the effects o f question ordering (Zaller and
Feldman, 1998, pp. 580).
Zaller and Feldman (1998, p. 579-584) also observe that in a typical survey,
individuals do not express opinions with sufficient specificity, answers to survey
questions have been found to be unstable and incoherent, and most individuals base their
responses to survey questions on whatever thouglits are at hand at the moment of
answering. Consequently, suiwey questions are answered randomly and often to only
politely indulge interviewers (Converse, 1964). Anderson (1988, p. 230) suggests that the
dominant survey-based methodology which employs statistical patterns in data to derive
inferences about beliefs does not provide clear understanding o f how people connect
ideas presented as survey items. She argues that in-depth interviews provide a more
fruitful way o f understanding the process by which people think and reason about politics
(ibid, p. 230).
Schuman and Scott (1987, p. 957 ) found that there is a significant difference between
answers to closed questions and open questions constructed in a respondent’s own words
and that closed questions sharply restrict frames of reference by focusing the
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respondent’s attention on limited alternatives. For example, a survey eommissioned by 6
Tuathail and O ’Loughlin (2005) asked respondents the following question; “Some people
say that the eurrent eonstitution o f Bosnia-Herzegovina does not work, to what degree do
you agree with this opinion?” With 72.6 pereent agreeing, the authors eonelude that there
is a eonsensus for ehange. This eonelusion is not questioned by the researeher per se.
However, when the researeher queried respondents with a university edueation about
their level o f knowledge regarding the state eonstitution, a majority admitted they knew
little about it exeept that it was part o f the Dayton Aeeords. Henee our belief that
inferenees gleaned from surveys ean be validated with qualitative interviews.

Rationale for Partieipant Seleetion
For the purposes o f this thesis, eomprehensive in-depth interviews were also preferred
beeause they bring to light subtle influenees sueh as the “paradox o f distanee”. In the
paradox o f distanee, the publie holds negative views o f govermnent and publie
administrators in the abstraet, but they have favorable views o f governmental programs
with whieh they interaet and favorable views o f the bureauerats whom they eneounter
(Frederiekson and Frederickson, 1995, p. 166). In addition. Converse (2004) observed
that eitizens o f transitional demoeraeies may answer polling questions with what he
termed non-attitudes, namely ad hoe opinions that individuals have not eonsidered or
held before the question was asked. The researeher was also eoneemed when preliminary
diseussions with colleagues in Sarajevo suggested that, given both the ideologieal aspeets
of formal education and its dubious quality in many areas o f Bosnia, it is unlikely that
many respondents would fully understand politieally oriented survey questions and eould
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not provide meaningful a n s w e rs .T h e caution that elites are more politically competent
than the general public is both empirically and theoretically sound. Robert Michels (1962,
p. 105) observed that, by virtue o f their formal training, educated leaders are superior to
the led. The incompetence o f the uneducated masses provides the educated leader both a
practical and moral justification. According to the “elitist theory o f democracy”, elites are
more strongly committed to democratic values such as political tolerance than ordinary
citizens (Gibson and Duch, 1991, p. 191) and therefore should be more aware of
democratic system deficiencies. Zaller’s reception axiom states that the greater a person’s
level of cognitive engagement with an issue (the middle class can be classified as such),
the more likely he or she is to be exposed to and comprehend political messages
concerning that issue (Dobrzynska and Blais, 2007, p. 260). For these reasons it was
decided that only university-educated informants would be chosen for the interviews.

Interview Setting
The interviews were held during a two-week visit to Sarajevo in February 2008. The
population under study comprised thirty-five volunteer adult citizens o f the Federation o f
BiH and Republika Srpska that either lived or commuted to work in the city of Sarajevo.
Eleven o f the participants were known personally to the researcher. Two participants
subsequently declined to participate. Thus, the final sample consists o f 31 subjects. Six
Bosnian Serbs, four Bosnian Croats and twenty-three Bosnian Muslims were interviewed.
Six females and twenty seven males were included. All subjects were employed. Three

See the Bertelsmann Transformation Index Country Report for confirmation o f
Bosnia’s education problems. URL: http://www.bertelsmann-transformationindex.de/177.0.html? &L= 1
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had previous experienee working for a foreign eompany in Bosnia or abroad. Seleetion
was largely opportunistie. Aeeess was gained with the assistanee o f a gatekeeper who
identified and approaehed individuals willing to partieipate in open and eandid interviews
about loyalty and problems in their respeetive entities.
Interviews were earried out in publie settings such as restaurants and eafes. To ensure
eonfidentiality, interviews were diserete and out o f hearing range o f non-partieipants. To
establish rapport with eaeh respondent, eoffee was purehased and some brief aneedotal
stories were shared. Relevant personal details were then eonfirmed. This introductory
period lasted approximately fifteen minutes. Before eaeh interview, the purpose o f the
projeet was explained. It was emphasized that painful or eontroversial subjeets sueh as
personal experienees during the war would not be raised, and if subjeets beeame
uneomfortable during the interview they would be allowed to stop. Eaeh aeknowledged
their understanding and then gave verbal approval before partieipating. Eaeh subjeet was
asked separately if their respeetive interview could be reeorded. It was explained that the
recordings were for later analysis by me only and that the individuals would remain
anonymous. At the eompletion o f taped sessions, informants were given a seeond
opportunity to destroy the reeorded data. A eommitment was also made to destroy the
reeordings after projeet eompletion. It also was made elear that the translator who was
present would respect strict privacy concerns. This was a matter o f speeial worry sinee
the topie o f eorruption was to be addressed. Seven subjeets gave permission to record.
Interviews were open in nature and subjeets were allowed to digress from question
topics. The interviews followed four broad themes: the respondent’s pereeption o f
loyalty, attitude about government performance, views o f the European Union, and
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attitude toward corruption. The interview methodology followed the principals o f
qualitative interviewing as described by Kvale (1996). The trigger question was: “Wliat
does the word loyalty mean to you?” Consistent with the goal o f the research, pre
prepared thematic questions addressing the topics of interest were posed periodically to
sustain the interview.^'' However, respondents were given considerable leeway and were
encouraged to be verbose. An effort was made to lead informants to reveal their
underlying rationales and personal attitudes. Identifying a logical link between
knowledge of, or personal experienee with, eormption and political alienation was of
particular interest. Most were willing to talk at length and in great detail without
prompting, although it was immediately found that the tape recorder had a negative effect
on openness. In the cases where taping was allowed, informants provided additional
information after taping was stopped. Actual discussion times lasted an average o f fortyfive minutes. After this duration, both subjeet and translator beeame fatigued. Another 15
minutes o f general conversation typically followed the interviews.

Data Analysis Procedure
There is no intent to interpret the interview data to establish sample generalizability.
This qualitative research is exploratory and descriptive only. The researcher's goal was to
learn whether a source o f political instability, other than ethno-nationalism, might exist,
and to acquire a description o f this source "in the terms and situational context" (Sehutt,
2006, p. 109) of Bosnians themselves. The "gatekeeper" was utilized to gain a sufficient
degree o f initial trust and rapport between participant and researeher, with the goal of

24

Topics o f open ended discussion are found in Appendix A.
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eliciting deeply personal opinions that would not he provided through a quantitatively
oriented survey questionnaire. This was necessary because one topic o f conversation
addressed corruption. The comments made in these interviews about corruption would
not have been be made without a great degree o f trust.
Although the interviews were perfonned at one point in time, it should not be viewed
as a single "snapshot". Attitudes are acknowledged by the participants as changing over
time. To acquire a level o f validity, the researcher followed the guidance o f Wolcott
(1990, pp. 127-135). Three of his nine points were important processes in this research.
First, efforts were made to record conversations accurately and fully. This “minimizes the
potential influence o f some line o f interpretation or analyses that might record
selectively” (ibid.). Second, writing was started early in order to record first impressions.
Otherwise, over time writings may become distorted due to discernment and reflection
(ibid). Third, an effort has been made to “let readers see for themselves” by “capturing
the expressed thoughts o f others rather than relying too singularly on what was observed
and interpreted” (ibid). All interviews, including taped sessions, were translated from
Bosnian into English in real time. Translation was performed by the gatekeeper. The
researcher synthesized the data and interpreted the subjects’ experiences by participating
directly in the interviews, took extensive notes, transcribed the recorded interviews, and
identified experiential themes in the respondent’s dialogues (Giorgi, 1985, p. 85).
Dominant themes were subsequently identified and summarized. Transcriptions and
supporting notes were made manually by the researcher in English during the interview.
These documents serve as the data for this analysis.
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The transcription o f each interview session was read several times in order to identify
pertinent plirases, words and themes. A coding scheme was developed to match (see
Appendix B). The code library was entered into the Ethnograph Version 5.08e^^ database.
The handwritten transcripts were then typed into the software database. The electronic
versions o f the transcripts were then broken down into text segments which were
assigned an appropriate code from the code library. The software sorting and grouping
capabilities were then used to align transcript content to relevant topic categories and
codes. For example, a table was generated that listed all transcripts with respective text
coded as “corruption” and “alienated” . These steps allowed the researcher to estimate the
frequency and variety o f themes.

Interview Findings and Discussion
Three interrelated themes emerged from the interviews. First, it is found that, among
all ethnic groups in the sample, loyalty to one’s respective entity is now outweighed by
the desire for more effective governance at all l e v e l s . T h e idea o f unconditional loyalty
to the Republika Srpska or the Federation o f Bosnia and Hercegovina was challenged by
the participants. Secondly, corruption and poor governance, although widely tolerated in
the past, have now reached such levels and permeated such a broad range o f society, that
they have become a huge human burden and are perceived as the greatest impediment to
social, economic and political progress. Third, the majority o f respondents exhibit
symptoms of political alienation. Again, the primary source o f this alienation is

Etlinograph v5.08, developed by Qualls Research.
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The phrase ‘all levels’ here means State, Cantonal, and Municipal government.
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corruption and poor governance. It is important to note however, that the participant’s
university edueation may have sensitized them to eorrupt behavior.
These three dominant themes guide the diseussions that follow. Actual interview
quotes are entered to supplement the discussion. For clarity purposes, these quotations are
bracketed. At times there was difficulty interpreting expressions, so in some instances,
only partial sentences are included. Also, at times discussions digressed from the topie.
This text is not included. The presence o f an ellipsis indicates that the quotation was
extracted from a longer sentence for brevity. Grammar is not always proper, sinee there is
an attempt to capture the wording as it was translated, where possible. These
summarizations should not be interpreted to imply precise quantification or
generalizability across the Bosnian population. They are intended only to provide a rough
characterization o f how frequently similar attitudes were expressed and how they were
formed.

Theme One - Political Loyalty
Serbs participants still identify with the Republika Srpska. This is reflected in the
following statements: [“Republika Srpska is a country for Serbs”]. [“There is patriotism
to Republika Srpska, loyalty to other Serbs and my village, family and friends.. .but, no
loyalty to country Bosnia”]. Muslims continue to favor dissolution o f the entities and
express solidarity with the country o f Bosnia. [“Loyalty means loyalty to the country, not
the entity”]. [“I support Bosnia the country and think the entities should be rem oved.. .not
to hurt Serbs but to make one country”]. [“Political loyalty is to Bosnia the country”].
[“My loyalty is to Bosnia. I am not interested in the Federation”].
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Loyalty was the first topic to be raised by a majority o f participants and comments
were given in a firm tone. This can be attributed to the faet that the subjects were nervous
at first. They may have anticipated a challenging response from the researeher, but when
they found none their mood quickly became more relaxed and open. No Muslim or Croat
participants expressed loyalty or allegiance to the Federation o f Bosnia and Hercegovina.
Two Muslim males who had traveled and worked in Europe expressed their loyalty to the
European Union. [“I want to be a European and want Bosnia to be part o f Europe”]. [“I
have loyalty to the EU - no loyalty to the etlmic groups, as these are a cover for party
power. I am a citizen o f Europe”].
As the participants relaxed, it was observed that their etlmo-political attitude was no
longer being constructed in terms o f nationalism and hatred. It appeared that lines o f
allegiance are now blurred and loyalty is becoming less dependent on ethnicity. Although
most respondents were quick to express their respective preferences regarding entity
configuration, it was not communicated to the researeher in a context o f hatred or
defiance, nor did it overshadow the interview as it undoubtedly would have a decade ago.
One Muslim respondent characterized this change when he stated: [“ .. .even the most
radical Serbs are not looking for etlmieally pure areas”]. In some eases, discussions about
etlmic loyalty beeame almost nostalgic in nature. [“Well I used to be loyal to Bosnia. You
know, this war was for Bosnia, not for the Federation.. .we were fighting for a country
not for this or that entity”], [“Just imagine what it was like to have your country dissolve
- it was fine to be a Yugoslav”] [“So these leaders are joined like strong brothers beeause
they are fighting together and this is a powerful force.. .”].In the view o f several other
respondents, ethnic political issues are no longer eonsidered to be the primary factor in

65

political decision making. Many respondents stated that they were tired o f discussing
ethnicity and that the use of this to portray Bosnian politics is inaccurate. [“I do not care
about Republika Loyalty anymore as long as a system is put in place”]. [“There are no
entity loyalties. All citizens want good is governance...”]. [“Loyalty to entity is not
realistic question. The war and what is happening now is ahout power and money”].
[“Ethnic questions are not applicable”].
All participants seemed resigned to accept that the reality o f the de facto partition in
Bosnia. Serhs have been compelled to sell their homes and move to the RS. Muslims
have been pressured to do the same and move to the Federation. Yet, in several
interviews, Serh respondents indirectly acknowledged that ultimately the Republika
Srpska can never be an independent State. [“I don't know if we can be independent our
economy is too small”]’. [“Loyalty is a difficult thing to describe. I am loyal to Serhs, hut
sometimes loyalty doesn't mean agreeing. Well, I am loyal to the idea o f independent RS
but this independence should be a modem independence. Not through an isolated RS but
through some agreement with Bosnia and European Union. This is the best way for us”].
Similarly, some Muslim respondents, despite their Entity preference, were willing to
agree to independence for the RS. [“I have loyalty to Bosnia. Entities should be dissolved
- but never will be. So it seems we must live with this separation for a long time. I have
no problem now letting Serhs have their own independence, but they should not get all 50
percent o f land - say 30 percent. I don't care about it much let them have an independent
country or join with Serbia”]. [“I have no problem with an independent RS but prefer one
country..”].
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There was also awareness that ethnic loyalties were somewhat transient and that
latent ethnic suspicions are used to manipulate vulnerable country residents during pre
election periods. One can detect a distrust o f political parties due to this fear mongering.
[“The parties have made us afraid o f restarting war. People are afraid o f killing. There
has been some talk on television o f a new war. This is party talk to scare people”]. [“I
don't care about entities. But country people, many are now in Sarajevo, are frightened at
election time, frightened of killing, they are easy to manipulate. But for me, 1just want a
country that will allow me to make m yself better. Make some more money and buy a
country house. So I don’t care if there are entities or not. The question is not
meaningful”]. [“Ethnic loyalties come up at election time only”]. [“Political parties that
have enough money can go into the countryside and agitate the poor, suspicious country
people and make them afraid o f a return to violence - make them feel as if someone could
get killed again”]. [“This remains an issue today because politicians have kept it in our
ears - the parties keep us thinking about”]. [“Mostly uneducated from the country areas
are manipulated by the ethnic rhetoric”].
The Dayton Accords and the State constitution were rarely discussed. The few
comments made were either negative or neutral. Many appeared to have no knowledge o f
Dayton’s content. [“Dayton is not giving to us results. Every party is looking to the
constitution for their own purposes only with no results”]. [“Yes, Dayton stopped the war
but now everything is different. Dayton doesn't mean anything today”]. [“Dayton cannot
help us, only EU membership can help Bosnia”]. [“The constitutions mean nothing and
are just for foreigners to practice intervention”]. [“Our constitution does not work”].
[“No, I have no knowledge o f my constitution”]. It was also noted that some the subjects
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had little understanding o f the concept o f democracy. [“I cannot describe details about
democracy”]. It is concluded that a lack o f knowledge o f their eonstitution and a lack o f
understanding about democraey have not prevented Bosnians from reeognizing or
responding to bad governance. Moreover, a poor opinion o f the Dayton Aeeords does not
necessarily indieate ill feelings toward the United States. More than one subjeet
suggested that America should come back and sort out their bad government. [“I just
want a return of good govermnent. I am willing to let Ameriea eome baek and run the
govermnent.. .anything would be an improvement”]. [“Well, do you think they ean help
us stop politieians from stealing? Can you stop this? Can America come back and help us
do this?]. [“Why doesn't America do something ahout it? Why don't they arrest the
criminals?]. Looking outside their own govermnent and eountry is an indieation o f
diseouragement and alienation.

Theme Two - Corruption and Poor Governance
Almost all partieipants demonstrated outrage toward connpt government offieials,
public employees and elected politieians. [“Elected officials are eorrupt”]. [“Most seek
offiee and high positions so they ean put their family and friends into other jobs”],
[“ ...discouraged with politieians getting rich and ignoring their joh”]. [“Now they just try
to become rich... corrupt. It is the only way they can acquire so much money. How else
can they do it?”]. [“Politicians are corrupt - more than acceptable”]. [“They are
politieians beeause they can become rich and they do this in many ways”]. [“Yes there is
a serious problem o f politieians putting their friends into position”]. [“Some politicians
are caught already and are still running for office”]. [“There is no respect for the law and
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there is no concern by corrupt politicians about getting caught”]. [“There was a big
problem with Electroprivreda^^ some years ago, not so long”]. [“I am very disappointed
with elected officials because they seek personal profit in their jobs”]. [“Politicians are
not there to help people they are there for themselves”]. [“They are making deals and
doing wrong things to get rich”].
Some participants linked corrupt officials to war profiteers. [“Well, nobody had
coffee during the war but some were selling it at a very high price. These people are still
doing these things. They are very rich and very dangerous”]. Other participants were not
timid about associating politicians with organized crime. [“It is the politicians who can be
blamed for this because they think they are special and they became criminals. Even they
are continuing business they started during the war. Many are nothing more than
gangsters and mafia”]. [“This is what the parties really are, mafia”]. [“They are connected
to the politicians. They are never arrested and politicians are helping them not us”]. [“I
hate politicians. They are thieves and mafia”]. [“All o f these politicians are small mafia”].
The judiciary, public employees, and police were also accused o f corruption.
[“Getting license.. .pay bribe to get drivers license”]. [“Also there is corruption in the
education system. You can pay for a test pass, or to be accepted to university”]. [“So
there are many crimes, especially at the border area.. .stolen cars”]. [“Also some police
stops”]. [“You pay to escape false speeding ticket or traffic violation”]. [“I have
witnessed a corrupt judge”]. [“Yes there is corruption everywhere. But, the most
dangerous is politicians and judges. They are not afraid o f being caught”]. Corruption in
Bosnia’s medical system also angered many subjects. [“We can accept low employment

Electroprivreda is the Bosnian Public Electric Utility.
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but not corruption, especially medical services. Several hundreds o f

is required to

get average medical service”]. [“Health care requires cash payment to doctors, but
supposed to be free”]. [“ .. .angry about having to pay bribes for medical care”]. [“ .. .some
doctors have false credentials. And o f course you must pay for medical service which
should be free - or a small cost”]. [“ .. .can't get medical attention without a bribe”]. [“The
doctor service you get depends on the amount o f the bribe”]. [“Medical coverage for my
son required a bribe”]. [“ .. .and medical care, all must pay”].
Participants expressed frustration that citizens could do nothing to end the corruption.
It was commented that it would be physically dangerous for anyone trying to do so.
Several subjects, while discussing the corrupt, stated: [“and there is no way to catch them
and if you try you will be killed - yes you will be. It is dangerous. We know this, they are
corrupt and do things they shouldn't. Even so we don't complain. Who will listen to us?].
[“People do not trust the politicians.. .they are very powerful and very dangerous”].
[“.. .we can’t do anything to stop it. Nobody alone can stop them, it is too dangerous”].
[“These people are still doing these things. They are very rich and very dangerous”].
[“Corruption... I can’t tell you more than you have heard already. You know this is a
very serious problem, and dangerous for anyone trying to stop it”].
It was also observed that complaints about corruption were often linked to comments
regarding economic inequality. In the view o f a number o f subjects, it is considered
wrong for politicians to be self-serving, especially when average citizens are poor. This
is an important observation since it provides a reason how anti-corruption attitudes are
formed. [“No, corruption does not bother me usually, but it is becoming unfair because

The main currency in Bosnia is the Convertible Mark (KM).
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they are becoming very rich while most are poor in Srpska”]. [“Elected officials are
corrupt. All o f them were poor before the war. They had nothing before being elected
into office or getting their positions. Now they have big houses and cars...”]. [“Also
politicians are getting rich - poor before election”]. [“Who will listen to us? We stay
quiet and poor”]. [“This is a problem today. Politicians don't have respect for people”].
[“It is this hypocrisy, when people are suffering...”]. [“Patriotism, for what...politicians
control everything and become rich and we are poor”].

Theme Three - Political Trust and Efficacy
The majority o f subjects expressed a low degree o f confidence in goveimment. As
pointed out earlier, this is a product o f low political efficacy. It is one consequence o f
estrangement from one’s government and a correlative o f political alienation. [“Bosnia
was worth fighting for in 1993... but not now”]. [“There is no response from
government. Most Bosnians will say the same. There is no input to government. I am
very discouraged. OHR is not accountable to citizens. Is this democracy?], [“ ...absolutely
no help or responsiveness from government. I am highly dissatisfied; anyone will tell you
the same thing. I am generally not optimistic about Bosnia]. [“We have had several
elections and an opportunity for effective government but failed. I will not vote anymore.
I don't have any faith in Bosnian politicians”]. [“I am generally frustrated about the bad
situation in BiH. There has been no improvement since Dayton times”]. [“There is
something wrong with the whole system. It is not just the politicians in power now, but
because things remain the same even when politicians change. Something needs to
change throughout the country. Citizens are apathetic and government takes advantage”].
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[“No I am not represented by government, no way to express my views or opinions even
on a municipal level”]. [“1 am very frustrated due to the laek o f progress in BiH. It is like
time has stopped. There is absolutely no help from the politicians”]. [“We need to eorreet
this problem before we move forward. Bosnia needs a new government”]. [“1 really don't
know what to do about this situation here. But anything would be better than what we
have”]. [“Politicians do nothing. Something needs to be done but I don’t know how to fix
it. No, there is no serviee from government. It is a joke. Politieians are not there to help
people they are there for themselves. Politieians are isolated from us”].
A deeline in politieal partieipation, notably voting, is also symptomatie o f politieal
alienation. During the interviews, several partieipants stated that there is no point in
voting because the government is ineffeetive and unresponsive. [“Many do not vote
beeause they do not see BiH as a democraey”]. [“I probably will not vote. I don't see any
need to partieipate. There are only bad ehoiees”]. [“We have had several eleetions and an
opportunity for effeetive government but failed. I will not vote anymore”]. [“Maybe I
will not vote”]. [“A eitizen votes but 1 have not voted beeause o f the bad ehoiees”]. [“1
am not voting again”]. [“Politieians are isolated from us. I will not vote next time. I voted
in 1996, but no more”]. [“Citizens are losing interest in voting and being eitizens”].
[“Yes, 1 have voted in the past but I will not vote next time. Beeause nothing
changes...”].
Anti-democratic radicalism is a third indicator o f political alienation. It is the view of
the majority o f respondents that fighting eorruption and establishing good govemanee are
needed urgently. Bosnians state that they are not capable o f fighting eorruption within the
present system. They fear corrupt officials linked with organized erime. Consequently, a
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forceful and authoritarian non-democratic form o f government was advocated since it
would exercise the necessary force for a quick and decisive solution. [“We need an
authoritarian system now”]. [“I would welcome an authoritarian leader. I just want a
return o f good government”]. [“I am willing to accept some forceful leadership - to make
people obey the law and become good citizens”]. [“Citizens are apathetic and
government takes advantage. But many are now angry to the point where they will act in
rebellion - or support a strong leader”]. [“Yes I will support a stronger system that
provides more discipline and law enforcement”]. [“I am tired o f politics and wish
someone would step in and do something about it. Anything is better than what we now
have. We need a strong forceful leader, authoritarian, a government like Putin's. Russia's
system is good”]. [“I wish someone would get power that was strong enough to do
something about it. We need a strong leader. I don't care if it is a democracy or not. I
don't care about politics or how it is done.. .just get things fixed. I don't care if it is a
police state”]. [“We need a forceful ruler who will put this mafia away in jail”]. [“But this
is what we need, a strong police. It has become so bad, forget human rights. Let police
shoot them ...”]. [“I really don't know what to do about this situation here. But anything
would be better than what we have. You know we want some forceful leaders. Replace
the old style leaders with someone new who is not afraid and cannot be purchased. We
need to be controlled. We cannot govern ourselves well at this time. We have so little
experience”]. [“I would be willing to do anything to fix this, even return to Tito days”]
Many subjects also expressed that they would leave Bosnia if they were able. Support
for EU membership was often due to the likelihood o f acquiring a visa which would
allow them to leave Bosnia and work in other European countries. [“I would leave BiH if
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I could, especially to work in Europe. I cannot do this without a passport and Visa”].
[“ .. .would leave if possible”]. [“When we get membership more educated people will
leave”]. [“Yes, I support EU membership - it will allow me to get work in Europe”]. [“I
hope we get EU membership soon so I can find a job”]. [“Yes, I favor EU membership
because I can work in Germany - 1 have family there”]. [“I would leave Bosnia if I
could”]. [“Most will leave for work - especially the young. They see the EU as an escape
from BiH”]. [“Few educated people left they continue to leave when they are able”].
[“Most Bosnians would leave now if they were able”]. [“Yes, I would leave if I could get
a visa”]. [“Yes, I would leave if I could get a visa to stay in Europe or Canada”]. [“I will
leave Bosnia if I can...”].

Discussion
Although these observations are limited and not generalizable to a larger population,
it is important to point out that for every one o f the participants endemic corruption is the
source o f at least one symptom typical o f political alienation from Bosnian governance.
These symptoms include political apathy, a declining confidence in democracy, a desire
to leave the country, and a viewpoint that some non-democratic methods o f governance
may be an acceptable solution to the country's severe corruption problem. O f particular
interest are the similarities between the comments regarding the nature o f corruption; for
example bribery required to get service in the socialized health care system. The
interviews also garnered a number o f interesting secondary observations not addressed
here in detail. For instance, the researcher was struck by the fact that there were no
derogatory comments made about any o f the ethnic groups. Each respondent spoke

74

positively about their day-to-day encounters with individuals o f different ethnicity.
Comments were made about free and safe travel througli once dangerous towns. More
than once it was commented that the police behaved fairly to Muslims in the Republika
Srpska. Serbs frequently spoke kindly o f Muslims and Croats and visa versa. It was made
clear to the researcher that questions about ethnic tension were no longer applicable to
present day life in Bosnia. There was also a striking lack o f awareness o f the concept o f
civil society. For example, none o f the respondents considered volunteering to participate
in political activities. The concept o f citizens having a responsibility to actively pursue
holding elected officials accountable was foreign to the respondents. One o f the most
insightful comments from the interviews was from a Muslim male who stated: [“the
biggest problem in Bosnia is that people and politicians are not changing”]. Many
indicated that they have simply given up and were controlling their immediate
enviromnent by hiding from politics. [“ .. .now most o f us hide in our small villages
ignoring politics, and not caring who is elected...”]. It was also observed that there were
no themes unique to any given ethnic group. All subjects communicated essentially the
same urgent message, namely that government perfonnance, responsiveness o f elected
officials, and fighting corruption are their highest priorities.
It is important to bear in mind that many o f the preceding interpretations are derived
from brief snippets o f conversation interpreted from Bosnian to English, and then written
down in real time. Under such research conditions, there is a dual risk of
misunderstanding. The interpreter may misrepresent what has been spoken, and the
researcher may further incorrectly record what has been interpreted. Furthennore, in
some instances, the tenu "corruption" may serve as a derogatory "catch-all" term that
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doesn't mean corruption at all. Participants may be using this term too freely. More
extensive research within a broader sample will be needed to detect this.
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CHAPTER 7

SUMMARY AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
What academics and politicians continue to say and write about Bosnia-Herzegovina
is, more often than not, grounded in the assumption that it is an ethnicity paradigm that
continues to cripple the country’s democratization. Because Bosnian politics have been
framed in these terms for so long, this paradigm has become widely accepted as a on
going political reality. This proposition is not unproblematic. The results o f this research
tentatively suggest that, within Bosnia’s middle class, ethnicity based nationalism is no
longer the primary source o f political attitude formation. This conclusion is based, in part,
on the premise that the Bosnian middle class possess a coherent and accurate
understanding o f the current political and social undercuiTcnts within their country. Their
understanding includes an awareness o f the behavior o f political elites and its
implications. These individuals however, are not immune to discouragement and
disaffection. What these individuals have stated herein strongly suggests a political
opinion shift away from support for the ethno-nationalist and entity based politics that
was predominant several years ago. This attitudinal shift appears to have been caused
primarily by the destructive effects o f widespread corruption. Importantly, the direction
o f this change is not toward democracy as a solution. The interview data gathered during
this research suggests a shift toward political alienation. Research participants have
expressed marginal faith in elected officials who are now viewed as self-serving, with
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little respect for democracy and the rule o f law; especially the principle o f legibus
solutus. Their social and economic needs are not being responded to. Some expressed
that they would be willing to leave the country if they were able. Others implied support
for non-democratic means o f governance.
This thesis concludes therefore, that although Bosnia has been inching ever closer to
European Union membership from an institutional and administrative perspective,
democratization is now at risk because it’s educated elite have become politically
alienated. The absence o f an active democratic consensus among a democracy’s middle
class is cause for concern. In stable democracies, the middle class is one o f several elite
segments that possess resources, possess specialized talents, “hold authoritative positions
in powerful public and private organizations and influential movements, and are therefore
able to affect strategic decisions regularly” (Higley, Hoffinan-Lange, Kadushin, and
Moore, 1991, p. 36). They provide an important influence balancing and synthesizing
function in their competition with other elite hubs (ibid.). The active participation o f a
country's middle class in the political arena helps prevent zero-sum, wimier take all,
majority decision making (Higley, Hoffinan-Lange, Kadushin, & Moore, 1991, p. 37).
Despite the creation o f democratic institutions and procedures, corrupt politicians are
playing what Higley and Pakulski (2000) term “elite power games”. Bosnia's middle
class recognizes that citizens are trapped in a circle o f corruption, patronage and
clientelism. The boundaries o f horizontal and vertical accountability are damaged. Civil
society cannot respond because it is essentially non-existent. Consequently Bosnia’s
middle class may be changing their mind about democracy.
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The EU’s SAA is providing short term regional security advantages, as intended.
However, pervasive corruption is preventing democracy from securing a foothold in
Bosnian society. Wolfgang Petritsch’s early vision o f Bosnians accepting ownership has
proved predictably ineffective. Bosnia’s democracy will be no more than a façade unless
its leaders come to value democracy’s essential principles. It is not sufficient for the
European Union to reprimand Bosnian politicians about corruption at arm ’s length while
leaving the Bosnians to solve this problem by themselves. Rational choiee theory dietates
that self-interested political actors are not altruistieally motivated. Rationality should be
constrained by the accession process. The present incentive for politieal elites to ehange
their behavior is not strong enough, and sinee sueh ehange would involve a loss o f
personal and politieal benefits it will eertainly not eome voluntarily. Reforms requiring
moral eommitment should be receiving the highest priority and oversight from Brussels.
Bosnia’s movement forward in the long aeeession proeess should be made eonditional
upon significant reductions in the levels o f corruption. The European Union will have a
diffieult time eontinuing to justify to average Bosnian eitizens the value o f vague and
distant membership in the faee o f severe soeial inequality. Moreover, Europe's Bosnia
policy discourse needs to be realigned more with genuine publie eoneems, and away
from the high-level politieal and économie issues. SAA poliey initiatives need to address
the implications of corruption.
Legitimacy grants patience, flexibility and toleranee toward new governments. It is
the foundation o f demoeratie eonsolidation. Bosnia’s laek of popular legitimaey is
resulting in impatienee. With EU membership realistieally more than a deeade away,
Bosnia’s naseent demoeraey may ultimately be plaeed at risk. Bosnia could easily eaught
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in what Diamond terms an “authoritarian undertow” now affecting countries such as
Nigeria, Russia, Thailand, Venezuela, and most recently Bangladesh and the Philippines
(Diamond, 2008). Leaders such as Russia’s Vladimir Putin and Venezuela’s Hugo
Chavez immediately come to mind. One danger o f declining legitimacy is that a
disillusioned public may embrace an alternative form o f government, either permanently
or temporarily. Democratic turn-arounds are not uncommon. As Diamond (ibid.) points
out, this occurred spontaneously in Nigeria in 1983, in Thailand in 1991, and in Peru in
1992.
In addition, democratic institutions alone do not guarantee democracy and political
legitimacy. More robust reform policies that develop democratic and ethical norms in
governance need implementation, notably in the area o f corruption. The Bosnian middle
class need to be empowered because they are more apt to see tlirough rationalizations o f
policies and ideologies. They are also more qualified to recognize what is good for the
public interest. To affect the behavior o f politicians, the European Commission must
modify the accession process and demand that Bosnian leadership meet its expectations
for the rule o f law, justice, a better life, and a fairer society before allowing Bosnia to
proceed further in the SAP.
It is not unreasonable to suggest that EU member countries and international donors
will ultimately grow tired of funding Bosnia’s stagnant pre-accession process. The distant
benefits o f EU enlargement do not resonate well with today’s European voters. Domestic
politics could potentially alter Bosnia’s accession. Italy is considering restricting
Romanian migrants and the latest Eurobarometer poll on enlargement indicates support
for only Croatia (The Economist, 2008). Also, Hazama (2007) has found that, on public
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support for EU enlargement, expectations o f democratization influence community
attitudes, and were the most important determinant o f support for enlargement in the case
o f Turkey.
Recommended objectives o f further research include interviews among a wider and
more representative sample o f middle class citizens. Interview question topics could be
added to examine the lack o f confidence and influence middle class elites hold in Bosnian
politics. The strong elite consensus described in this thesis should be manifesting itself as
an active intervening influence in domestic and EU politics, but it is not.
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APPENDIX A

OPEN ENDED INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

Loyalty
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

What does loyalty mean to you?
Do you think there are different types o f loyalty?
How is your loyalty formed?
Describe your loyalty to the Republika Srpska.
Describe your loyalty to BiH.
Describe your loyalty to the European Union.
Describe your loyalty to the OHR.

Perceptions o f the Bosnian State Constitution
•
•
•

What does the Constitution mean to you?
What does it mean to be a good citizen?
What is your understanding o f democracy?

Perceptions o f Govermnent
When you think o f government what comes to mind?
What things should a govermnent not do?
What are the major problems in Bosnia
O f these problems which do you think are the most important?
In what ways does govermnent affect your life?
Do you feel that you have some say in how govermnent acts?
How much of the time do you think you can trust the govermnent?
Do you feel as if you are well represented in government?
Who runs the govermnent?
In general what would you like to see different in Republika Srpska? Why?
How do you feel about the European Union?
Is EU membership a higher priority than RS autonomy?
Corruption
•

Have you experienced corruption personally?
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Where does corruption occur?
Does corruption affect your view o f the government?
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DATA CODE BOOK
ALIENATED:
ANTIS YS:
CORRUPTION:
DAYTON:
DISCOURAGE:
ENVIRON:
EU:
FEAR:
FEDBIH:
FRUSTRATED:
INEQUALITY:
LEAVE:
LOYALTY:
MEDICAL:
OHR:
PARTICIP:
PARTY:
PERFORM:
POLICE:
POLITICIAN:
RS:
USA:
VOTE:

Subject demonstrated symptom o f political alienation
Subject advocated non-democratic government
Subject commented about corruption
Subject commented about Dayton Peace Accord
Subject expressed discouragement with political or social situation
Subject commented about enviromnental issues
Subject commented about the European Union
Subject expressed fear o f revenge by corrupt individuals
Subject commented about Federation Entity
Subject expressed frustration with political or social situation
Subject commented about economic inequality
Subject commented about leaving Bosnia
Subject commented about loyalty to Country or Entity
Subject commented about corruption o f medical field
Subject commented about OHR
Subject commented about civic participation (see VOTE)
Subject commented about political parties
Subject commented about government performance
Subject commented about police corruption
Subject commented about politicians
Subject commented about Republika Srpska
Subject commented about USA
Subject commented about voting (see PARTICIP)
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